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Introduction 
The Euro Area summit of June 2012 marked the turning point in the approach to tackle the 
crisis. For the first time, European leaders recognised that the economic distress was not 
confined only to the fiscal difficulties of certain countries. Instead, they realised that it was 
imperative to break the link between Member States’ public finances and the health of their 
banks. In fact, national backstops, that were used to recapitalise banks, produced a sharp 
increase of countries’ debts and started a vicious circle between overindebted sovereigns and 
undercapitalised banks. Therefore, the European leaders committed themselves to the launch 
of the Banking Union, which is the most important policy initiative since the start of monetary 
union in 1999, necessary to enhance the euro-area integration. This new regulatory framework 
involves the transfer of responsibilities for the banking policy, from the national to the European 
level. In a longer-term perspective, the Banking Union was also established to develop a 
substantially more effective single market. A centralized supervision and resolution can indeed 
give the necessary policy push to encourage the return to financial integration. Even, the so-
called “outs” should take into consideration the option to join the Banking Union, given the fact 
they exhibit a high degree of cross-border banking activity.  
The significant milestones in the process of building a more robust and resilient banking system 
in Europe started with the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), led by the 
European Central Bank (ECB), and the launch of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM),  
led by the Single Resolution Board (SRB), which is also responsable for the Single Resolution 
Fund (SRF). In addition, in November 2015, the Commission adopted a proposal for a European 
Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), which is still a missing piece of the Banking Union. The 
fundament of these three pillars consists in the so-called European Single Rulebook, that is a 
set of harmonised laws to ensure a more resilient, transparent and efficient banking sector. A 
particularly important role is played by the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), 
adopted by the European Union in May 2014. On the one hand, it provides a collection of 
resolution tools, among which the bail-in is the most important one. This was a reaction to the 
global reform effort to mitigate moral hazard in banking systems, known as the “Too-Big-To-
Fail” problem. In fact, bail-in rules, together with the Single Resolution Fund, ensure the 
minimisation of taxpayer funding. On the other hand, the BRRD has also improved the 
regulatory attention to the period preceding the resolution. In particular, the rules on early 
intervention offer the possibility to a bank to be restored to normal conditions before it is forced 
to be solved. In this way, the early management of a likely failing bank would be extremely 
important to help the financial system to additionally mitigate the systemic risk. 
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However, although there is a significant discussion on the triggers for resolution, it might not 
always be clear when the early intervention should be triggered. In fact, the legislation specifies 
only in a general manner the conditions to start the recovery phase and appointed the European 
Banking Authority to issue some guidelines to facilitate their consistent application. In contrast 
with these guidelines, some studies have elaborated models that try to address the lack of 
appropriate quantitative indicators to trigger the early intervention. The quantitative approach 
can have several advantages, such as the possibility, for competent authorities, to reduce the 
number of mistakes made during the decision to start the recovery, to sanction the institution or 
not intervene at all.  
One of the most recent and significant attempt is provided by Goodhart and Segoviano (2015), 
a metric which has several qualities. However, it includes also one main limitation, that is the 
fact that their model, as regards the insolvent banks, employs data of US investment banks, 
which are found to be decisive in the final results. On the contrary, I tried to develop a model 
for the Italian banking system, which takes into account the Italian banks that are listed in the 
Milan stock exchange, excluding the institutions that conduct mainly investment banking 
activity. In this way, the model allowed me to evaluate and compare both the past and the 
current conditions of Italian banks, with respect to their probability of default and their ability 
to absorb the potential extreme losses that may occur. Ideally, such information could also be 
used by competent authorities to better balance the quantitative intervention threshold. 
Nevertheless, the results on insolvent banks are not as much reliable as those for the solvent 
banks, given the lack of data on the former, which is a common problem to all European studies. 
This present work is therefore organised as follow. In Chapter 1 I describe the policy responses 
and the regulatory evolution of the European banking framework, as a results of three different 
but interrelated periods of financial distress caused by the Global financial crisis. Therefore, I 
present the pillars and the foundation of the Baking Union project, together with its long term 
rationale. Then, in Chapter 2, I show how, in this new system, the competences are distributed 
among authorities, putting particular attention to the three phases defined by the Bank Recovery 
and Resolution Directive, that are the preparation, the early intervention and the crisis 
management. By focusing on the second one, I highlight, in Chapter 3, the potential advantages 
for the competent authorities of having at their disposal a scientific metric based on quantitative 
thresholds, which can help in the early intervention decision. As a consequence, I specify a 
model for the Italian banking system, on the basis of the Goodhart and Segoviano (2015)’s 
paper. After reviewing the relevant literature and presenting how the data were obtained or 
estimated, I discuss the results, prior to drawing conclusions.  
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1. The creation of the Banking Union  
1.1. The consequences of the global financial crisis for the European financial sector 
The global financial crisis, which originated in the US financial system, quickly and directly 
spread in Europe after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in late 2008. The well-known cause for 
this contagion was the huge exposure to toxic assets of the European financial institutions. In 
fact, 40% of the investments in securities backed by subprime mortgages, that produced an 
unsustainable credit risk, were held by European banks. Hence, many of them had to face 
serious liquidity and solvency problems, after recognising heavy losses on their balance sheets. 
Initially with this huge systemic banking crisis, governments and international organisations 
implemented expansionary fiscal measures and offered massive support facilities respectively, 
to counteract the economic downturn and provide relief to the banking sector. Some argue that 
the Great Recession and the following European debt crisis functioned as tests to understand 
how properly the features of European Union have worked (Schmidt, et al., 2011). For example, 
they allowed to assess the convenience or riskiness of the Union’s diversity and complexity. 
With more uniformity, the 2008 recession may have spread among the financial systems of 
different countries even quicker. At the same time, however, having “27 different regulatory 
systems for banks in place, largely based on national rules and rescue measures” (European 
Commission, 2014) did not facilitate, for example, the resolution of some failed banks. These 
circumstances would have required a much closer and more effective coordination, especially 
for international banking groups. Moreover, the crisis clearly showed that a deeper integration 
of the supervisory structures was needed. Yet, a number of difficulties arose due to the divergent 
views among national authorities, which often softened the prudential requirements for their 
domestic banks, to avoid putting them under pressure.  
In order to present the policy responses and understand how the European leadership reached 
the actual banking legislation, a brief description of how the crisis evolved during the last 
decade seems useful. In Hadjiemmanuil’s (2015, p. 4) view, the 2007-08 recession triggered in 
Europe: “not a single shock, but a set of consecutive and interrelated crises”. The author 
highlighted three overlapping periods of economic and financial distress, which are 
characterized by different symptoms, interpretations and reactions. At the beginning, the 
recession had global proportions affecting the European Member States altogether. The support 
given to ailed banks, to avoid the collapse of the financial system, produced complicated long-
term consequences as well. One of them was the growing belief that a number of large financial 
institutions would always have been rescued by their government, being “too big to fail”. Big 
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banks deliberately take high risk-return positions, knowing that they will supported whenever 
they face potential failure. In fact, problems in one of these banks may transmit to other 
financial institutions and, given their wide interconnections, they could destabilize the entire 
financial system.  
As a result, national budgets worsened and the serious fiscal imbalances affected the ability of 
many countries to maintain the access to their sovereign debt markets. Indeed, from late 2009 
to early 2012, the public finances of many Member States were put under pressure by the 
international capital markets. The increasing spread between interest rates charged on long term 
government bonds characterized the second phase of economic distress (Figure 1). Investors 
recognised that the countries in the “periphery” region had poorer economic conditions than the 
majority of central European partners. Again, financial assistance programmes were activated, 
since the unsustainability of their refinancing plans were questioning the survival of the single 
currency. However, such support measures were associated with the commitment of each 
distressed Member State to implement extensive structural reforms and follow cost-cutting 
programmes. European policy-makers introduced also longer-term policies consolidating the 
rules of the Stability Growth Pact. Lenders of last resort continued to demand austerity 
measures in order to reduce governments’ budget deficits and to demonstrate their fiscal 
discipline to creditors and rating agencies. In opposition to the “mostly fiscal” narrative as the 
main cause of the European troubles, Véron (2015, p. 7) claimed that the crisis was financial 
before it was fiscal. In his opinion, focusing exclusively on fiscal topics “tends to obscure less-
visible dimensions of the crisis that relate to deeper layers of solidarity and trust, or the lack of 
them”.  
 Figure 1: Daily goverment bond spreads in basis points 
 Source of data: Investing.com 
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In June 2010, the creation of the European Financial Stabilization Fund (EFSF) regularized a 
temporary bailout mechanism that provided a moderate relief after the rescues of Greece, 
Ireland, and Portugal. However, the political discordance of having a permanent bailout system 
initiated a shift in risk perceptions and intensified the uncertainty of the markets. Moreover, at 
the beginning of 2012, the European Union experienced increasing concerns about its collapse, 
because of the possible exit of one or more of its Member States. The interbank market 
deteriorated, making the access to liquidity drastically more expensive and difficult for banks. 
With a paralysed mechanism of the credit provision, banks’ balance sheets worsened, causing 
again liquidity and solvency problems. In particular, Spain, by launching another large-scale 
recapitalization of banks, brought the attention to the danger of the so-called “vicious circle” 
between sovereign debt and weak banks. This diabolic loop, that marked a third phase of the 
crisis, works in two ways. On the one hand, the deterioration of a government’s credit rating 
automatically undermines the solvency of the country’s banks, as they hold large amounts of 
their own governments bonds. On the other hand, a weakening of a country’s banking system 
deteriorates the government’s budget because of the potential bailout cost and the lower tax 
revenues, resulting from the subsequent economic downturn (Figure 2).  
The troubles of Spain, which is one of the largest economy in Europe, triggered major worries 
about the sustainability of the currency union, owing to the great chances to affect Italy and 
reasonably even France. The impending danger of contagion brought the European leadership 
to recognize the non-fiscal sources of economic distress and review the possible cures. Hence, 
 Source: (Brunnermeier, et al., 2011) 
 Figure 2: Diabolic loop between sovereing debt risk and banking debt risk 
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in June 2012 at the Euro Area summit, the European Council agreed to create a “Banking 
Union” as a direct remedy to the crisis. However, that meeting was only one of the last steps of 
a complex evolution process, devoted to the renewal of the European banking regulatory 
framework. 
 
1.2. The evolution of the European banking regulatory framework.   
The Euro Area summit held on 28th and 29th June 2012 marked the turning point in the approach 
to the crisis. For the first time, European leaders recognised that the economic distress was not 
confined only to the fiscal difficulties of certain countries, but was the consequence of a more 
challenging issue. In order to effectively break the vicious circle linking Member States' public 
finances and the health of their banks, they proposed a regulatory framework pooling the 
banking policy at the European level. However, this was not an innovative concept. As shown 
by Mourlon-Druol (2016), this idea dates back to the early 1960s, when European policy-
makers clearly planned a monetary integration, a financial integration and the banking 
regulation and supervision altogether. Even if it was premature and it largely failed, this initial 
project explains that the intentions to create common mechanisms for the banking sector were 
not crisis-driven. At that time in fact, sovereign-bank loop was not an issue, due to far lower 
levels of government deﬁcit and debt. 
The scenario drastically changed during the 2000s when, the transfer of responsibility for 
banking policy became necessary. The introduction of the single currency contributed to the 
growth of cross-border capital movements and the integration of banks. In a speech at the 
London School of Economics, Tommaso Padoa Schioppa (1999) anticipated that the monetary 
union would have needed a “multilateral mode” giving the banking industry a proper 
supranational supervisor, as efficient as the national authorities. As a result, since 2000, many 
initiatives about European cooperation have been proposed at different levels. Boccuzzi (2016, 
pp. 23-30) identified three restructuring phases. The reforms began with the “Lamfalussy 
Process”, which was designed to significantly simplify and rationalize the drawing up of 
financial rules. Established in 2001, this process initially supported the harmonisation of the 
financial markets laws to promote integration, but it was later extended to banking and 
insurance sectors. Lamfalussy conceived four levels, each of them focuses on a precise stage of 
the law implementation. At the third level, national authorities work on coordinating new 
regulations with other Member States. In 2004, three Committees were created at this level, in 
order to promote supervisory convergence and cooperation. In particular, the Committee of 
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European Banking Supervisors organization was created to function as “an independent body 
for reflection, debate and advice for the Commission in the field of banking regulation and 
supervision should be established” (European Commission, 2004). 
However, the distribution of responsibilities for the exercise of supervision firmly remained 
confined to national authorities. As a consequence, the existing regulation and structures for 
tackling banking emergencies were not able to cope with the Great Recession. For this reason, 
the Commission decided to undertake a review of the Lamfalussy process to reinforce the 
supervisory convergence, by giving a new organisational structure to the old committees. The 
debate for a more sophisticated regulatory regime led to the report chaired by Jacques de 
Larosiére (2009). Among many thing, his Group of work recommended that national 
supervisory authorities should be strengthened at first, in order to upgrade the quality of 
supervision. Then, they suggested that three innovative European authorities for closer 
cooperation in the regulation and supervision of cross-border financial institutions should be 
created. In fact, Recommendation 22 states that the EU should establish an integrated European 
System of Financial Supervision (ESFS). The European Banking Authority (EBA), the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) shaped the European Supervisory Authorities 
(ESAs). This new architecture was approved by the European Parliament in 2010 and, at the 
beginning of 2011, replaced level-three Committees. Together with ESAs, that is responsible 
for micro-prudential supervision of the financial system, the European Council approved the 
 Source: European Securities and Markets Authority 
 Figure 3: European System of Financial Supervision 
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formation of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), charged instead with the macro-
prudential supervisory tasks (Figure 3).  
This new institutional structure denoted a substantial step towards the integration of the EU 
financial supervision. For the first time, the supervisory powers were allocated at European 
level, even if not in absolute terms. However, the “de Larosiére Report” was only an 
intermediate step, useful to set the conditions for a more complete integration. The point of 
arrival for a truly centralization of supervisory functions was the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM). Indeed, its introducing Regulation of 15th October 2013 reported that “the 
crisis has shown that mere coordination is not enough, in particular in the context of a single 
currency”. In other words, the SSM marked the transition from the traditional principles of 
cooperation and coordination between national authorities to a centralization of supervisory 
functions at European level. 
Furthermore, the “de Larosiére Report” highlight the need for regulatory revision. The policy 
reactions focused on the correction of the banks’ governance and risk management and also on 
the reduction of the incentives responsible for excessive risk‐taking. The European Commission 
proposed about thirty packages of common rules to strengthen financial markets regulation and 
supervision and to preserve the integrity of the internal market. They were incorporated into a 
“Single Rulebook”, which is a set of harmonised laws that must be respected by all banks across 
the EU. The Rulebook ensures a more resilient, transparent and efficient banking sector. Instead 
of 27 different set of rules, it guarantees that all institutions apply, for example, the same capital 
requirements, thus making institutions more comparable. Indeed, its three key components are 
the prudential requirements and supervision, the management of banking crises and the 
insurance schemes for deposits.  
First of all, in order to recognise the Basel III agreement, on July 2011 the Commission adopted 
a legislative package to replace the old capital requirement rules with a new directive and a 
regulation, respectively the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) and the Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD IV). These new rules, which were applied from 1st January 2014, 
were meant to reduce the frequency of bank distresses, by providing ampler cushions to absorb 
losses. The insufficient level of capital, both in terms of quantity and quality, was the reason 
behind the provision of extraordinary assistance programs. Instead, the new structure made EU 
banks more solid, with higher capacity to effectively manage the risks linked to their activities. 
Then, on 6th June 2012, the Commission proposed a bank recovery and resolution framework 
to ensure that, even if a bank shows difficulties, it can be resolved without systemic 
repercussions on the financial system.  Almost two years later, the European Parliament adopted 
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the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) for all the 28 Member States, signalling 
the end of banks bailouts. The BRRD provide powers and tools to national authorities in order 
to restructure banks, prevent them from failing and allocate losses with a defined hierarchy. It 
requires also that banks have to arrange recovery plans to overcome problematic situations. Up 
to June 2016, almost all the Member States have fully implemented the BRRD. However, 
countries like Belgium, Croatia, France and Latvia have mostly done it, while Poland and 
Slovenia have not fulfilled the requirement yet (International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association, 2016). Switzerland, even if it is not obliged, introduced a regime with similar 
characteristics to BRRD. Moreover, outside the EU, Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway, could 
be required to introduce a similar regulation in the future, if BRRD will be incorporated into 
the European Economic Area Agreement.  Moreover, together with the CRD IV package and 
the BRRD, the Rulebook includes rules to strengthen deposit insurance. On 15th April 2014 the 
European Parliament adopted the Commission’s proposal for the revision of the 1994 Deposit 
Guarantee Schemes Directive (DGSD). Both a higher coverage and new insurance fees are 
essential features for the intensification of confidence in banking systems, which prevents 
depositors from making panic withdrawals from their bank. Additionally, by charging the banks 
with the full cost of deposit protection, the excessive risk‐taking would be discouraged. In 
conclusion, the Rulebook is also completed by the guidelines and recommendations of the 
European Banking Authority. In fact, one of the EBA’s most important functions is to support 
the development of the Single Rulebook. EBA can formulate Binding Technical Standards in 
order to specify certain aspects useful for the implementation of legislative texts. These 
standards become legally binding and directly applicable in all Member States as soon as the 
Commission adopts them.  
 
1.3. The birth of the Banking Union 
The SSM represented the birth of the first pillar of the so-called “Banking Union”, an expression 
that started to be used during the public debate at the end of 2011. It was Véron (2011) who 
used the term “Banking Union” in parallel to the earlier promoted idea of Fiscal Union. He 
pointed out that a European framework of banking policy, that would not take into account 
banking and political structures at the local level, is essential for the survival of the monetary 
union. Progressively, the new expression became commonly adopted by the media and among 
European officials in the spring of 2012. During that period, the first organization to put on the 
policy agenda the idea of Banking Union was the IMF. Its managing director, Christine Lagarde 
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(2012), suggested a fully centralized legal and institutional arrangement for the euro area’s 
banking system, since a single market cannot depend on a framework driven by asymmetric 
national interests. According to her report, this arrangement should have the shape of a single 
supervision authority, a single resolution authority with a common backstop and a single deposit 
insurance fund. The same framework was recalled in the European report “Towards a Genuine 
Economic and Monetary Union”, which was published on 26th June 2012. In this report, the 
European Council President Van Rompuy (2012) identify the integrated financial framework 
as one of the four essential building blocks crucial for a stable and prosperous EMU. The other 
milestones he suggested were a stricter regulation of member states' budgets, a more integration 
on economic policy and a stronger democratic legitimacy and accountability.  
The following Euro Area Summit on 28th and 29th June represented the key moment for the 
approval of the Banking Union project. During this event, the European political leadership 
recognized that it was imperative to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns. In 
order to do so, leaders committed themselves to two specific policy interventions. First, they 
invited the Commission and the Council to take into consideration the SSM legislation 
procedure with urgency. Second, they agreed to allow the European Stability mechanism 
(ESM), which was the permanent bailout system in the process of being established, to 
recapitalise banks directly under certain conditions. The ESM, replacing the fiscally vulnerable 
governments, would have ensured the same governance level between the exercise of 
supervision and the responsibility for bailouts. However, in July 2012, some countries 
backtracked on the last commitment, causing a quickly reverse of the earlier positive market 
reaction, with new peaks of volatility and uncertainty. Nevertheless, almost a month later, the 
famous Mario Draghi’s remark on the 26th July “whatever it takes to preserve the euro” and 
the announcement of the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) programme triggered a new 
major turnaround in market perceptions. With this move, the European Central Bank (ECB) 
announced that it was ready to buy considerable amounts of sovereign bonds to stabilize their 
prices of a country that was under extraordinary and unjustified market pressure. OMT 
announcement had huge impacts, even without requiring actual implementation. Its strength, 
combined with the launch of the Banking Union, was enough to stop the turbulence and boost 
market confidence. Indeed, from July on, the desired effect of reducing the bonds yields of the 
governments of the euro area’s periphery was remarkable (Figure 4). 
The President of the European Council stated that: “Central Bank was only able to take this 
[OMT] decision because of the preliminary political decision, by the EU’s Heads of State and 
Government to build a Banking Union” (Van Rompuy, 2014, p. 4). This declaration is a proof 
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that the decision to start a Banking Union and the following OMT announcement had a causal 
relationship (Véron, 2015, p. 4). Policy-makers and leaders affirmed that OMT was a necessary 
measure to defend the singleness and promote the correct transmission of monetary policy, 
while the SSM represented the indispensable prerequisite for the other pillars of Banking Union. 
Before any further steps involving financial risk-sharing, the system required a neutral and 
central point of supervision of all banks. The Council and European Parliament decided to 
entrust the ECB with the ultimate responsibility for specific supervisory tasks of Eurozone 
banks, reaching an agreement on 19th March 2013. The following September the SSM 
Regulations was favourably voted by the Parliament, while on 15th October 2013, when the 
European Council gave its approval, the SSM was finally enacted. Between November 2013 
and October 2014, ECB carried out its supervisory role with a comprehensive assessment of 
130 euro-area banking groups covering approximately 82% of total bank assets. It was an 
essential condition in preparing the SSM to become fully operational. Indeed, on 4th November 
2014, some days after the publication of the results of the stress test and asset quality review, 
the ECB formally assumed its supervisory authority. 
However, it is important to highlight that, even with an improved supervisory framework and 
intensified prudential requirements, the threat of a bank suffering a liquidity or solvency crisis 
could never be totally excluded. Against this possible background, the European Commission 
(2012) emphasised that a Banking Union should also have embraced a more centralised 
Figure 4: 10 Year Government Bond Yields  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source of data: Investing.com 
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management of banking crises, as a logical complement to the supervisory arrangement. Hence, 
based on the communication entitled “Roadmap Towards a Banking Union”, the Commission 
recommended the creation of a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), administered by a Single 
Resolution Board (SRB). Applying the rules of BRRD, the Board has more capabilities to 
manage cross-border bank crises than a network of national resolution authorities, given the 
necessity of prompt intervention and credibility. On the presentation of this proposal, Michel 
Barnier stated that: “ensuring that supervision and resolution are aligned at a central level, will 
allow bank crises to be managed more effectively in the Banking Union and contribute to 
breaking the link between sovereign crises and ailing banks” (European Commission, 2013). 
In accordance with the Commissioner Barnier, the resolution mechanism would have worked 
if it had involved all relevant national players and it had been backed by a suitable resolution 
funding arrangement. For this reason and to support the restructuring of defaulting credit 
institutions, a Single Resolution Fund (SRF) was proposed as an essential part of the SRM. The 
new single resolution system was quickly legislated by the end of 2013 and adopted by the 
European Parliament on April 2014. Before being fully operational at the beginning of 2016, 
many measures and legislative acts were adopted, in particular to decide the calculation criteria 
for the contributions to the fund. In addition, during this period the European Commission 
reintroduced the State aid control as a temporary substitute for the management of distressed 
banks. With this coordination instrument Commission authorised only restructuring plans that 
encouraged the restoration of the bank's long-term viability and that included an adequate 
burden sharing among shareholder and junior creditors, thus largely excluding the need of 
public support. Moreover, the plans had to include measures to minimize competition 
distortions and to maintain a level playing field in the internal market.  
As regards the construction of the SRF, all Member States, except the UK and Sweden, signed 
in May 2014 an Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) to avoid any risk of legal challenges. 
Starting from 2016, they agreed to collect resources up to 1.0% of insured deposits through 
bank levies raised at national level. Initially, it would involve national compartments that would 
be progressively merged over (Figure 5). However, this gradual mutualisation between 
compartments implies a temporary weakness. In fact, during this phase a portion of 
responsibility for funding failing banks stays at the national level, hence weakening the 
breaking effect of the bank-sovereign nexus. On the contrary, creating the fund in this way 
helps to guarantee that banks’ lending capacity to the real economy is not negatively affected 
in the short-term. Another possible shortcoming is that the SRF may need additional financing 
to manage potential funding shortfalls, especially through the transitional phase. (Although it 
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is widely acknowledged, including by EU official statements, that the SRF needs some kind of 
public backup in case its funding revealed insufficient to meet emerging needs, e.g. following 
failure of a large cross‐border banking group or a large number of banks at the same time, no 
agreement has been reached so far on the set up of such a last resort facility.  The ESM has been 
taken into consideration, in this context, as a potential provider of financial support to the SRF, 
but not as a direct participant in risk sharing). The SRM, without an explicit backstop that would 
lend to the SRF, could be ineffective. Hence, in December 2013, the EU finance ministers made 
a statement emphasising that a bridge financing would be available during its construction 
period (European Council, 2015). They decided that additional national sources would be 
backed by the ESM in conformity with existing procedures or by ex-post contribution from the 
banking sector. Therefore, at the end of 2015, each Banking Union’s member joined a 
harmonised Loan Facility Agreement, which is meant to provide a national individual credit 
line to support its own national compartment in the Single Resolution Fund. De Groen and Gros 
(2015) studied the size of this bridge facility. Their work, which was requested by the European 
Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, is based on the euro area bank 
resolutions that took place between 2007 and 2014. They estimated an additional €45 billion 
requisite if an economic downturn occurs during the transition period. Given this result, they 
concluded that a facility with a capacity similar to the €60 billion of the ESM could be 
appropriate. Moreover, in line with the statement of December 2013, a common backstop to the 
SRF will also be developed, to become fully operational at the end of the transition period. In 
Available part of own national compartment 
Available part from all national compartments 
Source: ECB  
 Figure 5: Construction of SRF 
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addition, the well-known “5 President’s Report” pointed out that both the system of national 
credit lines and common backstop should be fiscally neutral over the medium term and should 
also ensure equal treatment across all participating countries, as well as no costs for those which 
did not join the Banking Union.  
The 5 President’s Report was elaborated by the European Commission President Jean-Claude 
Juncker (2015), with the collaboration of the Euro Summit President, Donald Tusk, the 
Eurogroup President, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the European Central Bank President, Mario 
Draghi, and the European Parliament President, Martin Schulz. According to them, there are 
four fronts, in which legislative proposals need to be undertaken. They are the Economic Union, 
to boost competitiveness and structural convergence, the Fiscal Union, to deliver fiscal 
sustainability and stabilisation and the Political Union, to enhance democratic accountability. 
The fourth front is the Financial Union. The already presented call for an agreement to provide 
adequate bridge finances and the demand for a credible common backstop to the SRF were only 
two points of the program towards the completion of the Banking Union, that is one 
fundamental objective to achieve the financial integration. The first steps in these directions 
will characterise the so-called "Deepening by Doing" stage. During it, immediate actions will 
be taken using existing instruments and the current treaties. 
One of the first most important goal, necessary for the correct functioning of the SRF, is the 
full implementation of the Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive (BRRD). Under the new 
bail-in system, shareholders and creditors will bear the costs of resolution before any external 
assistance is provided. Galliani and Zedda (2015) demonstrated that the additional buffer 
financed by the bail-in tool can be really effective in breaking the vicious circle, thus stopping 
the contagion from banks to public ﬁnances. The transposition into national law is decisive for 
the SRF, since the fund is meant to provide assistance only after the bail-in of 8% of banks’ 
liabilities has taken place. In other words, SRF, which can also be used only for a maximum of 
5% of total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, is just a 
complement of the bail-in. For these reasons, the target size of the fund (€55 billion) appears 
much lower than the experienced losses of the last financial crisis (€313 billion). If we apply 
this new framework in the period from 2007 to 2014, only half of the almost sixty aided banks 
would have received public support from the fund (De Groen & Gros, 2015). Policy-makers 
expect that the substantial bulk of the resolution requirements will be administered through the 
bail-in and that the remaining part will call for a marginal intervention of the fund. Indeed, the 
suitability of the SRF in providing a credible backstop to the SRM is often overstated. Clearly, 
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this procedure is probably able to cope with the failures of individual banks, but it could be 
argued that the SRF, even at its final target size, might be insufficient in a new systemic crisis. 
In addition, after the collapse of a large cross‐border bank, greater chances of systemic crises 
are associated with the absence of a common deposit insurance. Hence, to reinforce the 
resilience of the banking sector, the last desirable step mentioned by the Five Presidents is to 
provide Banking Union with supranational deposit insurance, alongside SSM and SRM. 
Consequently, on 24th November 2015, the Commission adopted a proposal for a European 
Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). The function of EDIS will be to ensure an equal protection 
of deposits across countries of the Banking Union, regardless where the deposit is located. 
National schemes guarantee up to €100,000 of deposits if a bank goes bankrupt. However, they 
are less resistant to large local shocks than a common single scheme. Indeed, EDIS will have 
more widely distributed risks and collect resources over a much larger pool of financial 
institutions. In this way, the resilience of the banking sector against future crises will be 
enhanced and thanks to the greater confidence in bank deposits also lending will increase, 
meaning more growth and jobs for Europe.  
A Deposit Insurance Fund will be gradually built up in three stages. In the first one, the re-
insurance stage, EDIS funds can be accessed up to a certain level, only after exhausting national 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS). Then in the second one, the co-insurance stage, EDIS will 
contribute from the first euro of loss. The share will progressively increase until the full 
insurance stage, when EDIS will assume 100% of risks (Figure 6). The total amount, which 
  
 Source: European Commission 
 Figure 6: Evolution of EDIS funds compared to the funds of a participating DGS 
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will increase automatically if the banking sector grows, is planned to be 0.8% of the covered 
deposits of all banks in the Banking Union. After July 2024, the national DGS will continue to 
exist in order to manage any pay-out events and to work as an intermediary for depositors and 
banks. Moreover, it might also collect funds in addition to the 0.8% of covered deposits. EDIS 
will intervene if a defaulting bank is liquidated and its deposits need to be paid out. Besides 
this, to ensure that deposit access is not interrupted, EDIS will finance the transfer of the 
deposits to another institution when a failing bank is resolved. Following the Commission's 
proposal, the decision to trigger EDIS would be at the discretion of the existing Resolution 
Board, with a dedicated governance structure for its new tasks. In fact, a strong and independent 
authority is required, for example to decide and monitor the contributions inflows from the 
banks and manage pay-out cases. Therefore, the SRB will administrate both the resolution and 
deposit insurance funds, thus becoming the first point of contact in case of crisis management 
(European Commission, 2015). 
In November 2015, the Commission also declared that, in parallel to the work on EDIS’s 
legislative proposal, a full package of actions to reduce risks and ensure a level playing field in 
the Banking Union will be pursued. For example, it will make proposals to amend CRD 
IV/CRR to follow up Basel III. Moreover, the commission planned to implement Total Loss 
Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) requirements for banks by 2019 and also diversify their exposures 
to sovereign debts. Finally, a more consistent application of bail-in rules under BRRD and 
further harmonisation of national DGS schemes will be ensured, as well as the full transposition 
into national laws of the corresponding directives (European Commission, 2015). 
 
1.4. The long-term rationale for joining the Banking Union 
As previously discussed, the introduction of the Banking Union in June 2012 was the first 
reaction to tackle the sovereign-bank loop problem. However, another consequence of the crisis 
is that banks also diminished their foreign businesses. Moreover, banks, after having received 
support by national authorities, were asked to prefer domestic lending to the foreign one. 
Therefore, given this reduction of cross-border banking activity inside the European Union, 
many commentators emphasised that, in a long-term perspective, the Banking Union was 
launched to restore the European banking market (Schoenmaker, 2015) (Geeroms & 
Karbownik, 2014). Similarly, Véron (2015) stated “the underlying logic of Banking Union is 
that of the single market”. A genuine single market develops if banking groups are able to 
transfer excess capital and liquidity across the borders. To measure the international orientation 
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of banks, we can look at the outward or inward cross-border banking claims. On the one hand, 
a country characterized by outward cross-border activities has multinational banking groups 
that operate substantially outside the domestic market. On the other hand, inward cross-border 
activities identify the foreign banking exposures inside the country in question.  
However, the presence of strong cross-border activities would lead to coordination failure if 
supervision and resolution are not consolidated at the central level. This happens because 
national authorities are likely to adopt conflicting regulatory approaches, which may lead to an 
adverse concentration of risk in certain countries, increasing the likelihood of bank failures, 
contagion and, ultimately, disintegration of the Single Market. Schoenmaker (2011) identified 
these issues with the so-called “financial trilemma”, which adapts the “monetary trilemma” to 
the international finance. This new concept provides a theoretical foundation to have a Banking 
Union, since it highlights the impossibility of having financial integration, national financial 
policies and financial stability altogether (Figure 7). In accordance with Geeroms and 
Karbownik (2014, p. 16), the financial stability can logically be achieved only in two ways: 
“either, one returns to a world of segmented national banking markets and forgoes the benefits 
of integration, or one moves towards supranational structures for financial supervision and 
resolution”. In this way, centralized authorities are released from local pressures and can revise 
the condition of banks independently and in a systemic context. As a result, they concluded that 
a Monetary Union requires a Banking Union.  
The so-called “Outs” may also consider to join the Banking Union given the fact they exhibit a 
high degree of cross-border banking activity. Despite this fact, only the members of the single 
 Figure 7: The Financial Trilemma 
1. Financial stability 
2. International banking 
 Source: Schoenmaker (2011)  
 
3. National financial policies 
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currency have been included in all the features of the Banking Union by default. In the current 
situation, the governments outside the single currency are liable for bailing out the banks 
headquartered in their territory. As shown by the recent global financial crisis, such a fiscal 
backstop function can be very costly. For these reason, opting-in makes sense to reach financial 
stability and avoid coordination failure. Therefore, a central strategic issue for these countries 
is whether or not they should join the Banking Union. In general, if the Outs join the single 
currency, they will automatically participate in the Banking Union as well. Meanwhile, even 
without adopting the euro, they are allowed to take part in the Banking Union by notifying the 
request to enter into a “close cooperation” agreement. In particular, they must guarantee that 
their national supervisory authorities will adopt any measure requested by the ECB, accept any 
guidelines or instructions and provide all information on credit institutions. Close cooperation 
could also be terminated, both on the initiative of the country or the ECB.  
In order to understand the possible benefits of joining the Banking Union, Hutt and 
Schoenmaker (2016) verified, in their policy contribution, the level and the typology of the 
cross-border banking claims of the nine non-euro area countries. Starting from the outward 
banking claims, they showed that Sweden and Denmark’s top banks own assets for about 18% 
and 12% respectively in countries inside the Banking Union, especially in the Baltic region. 
Similarly, 22% of the Barclays’s holdings, the second UK bank in terms of assets, are in Italy, 
Spain, Germany and France. Mervyn King’s well-known aphorism that “banks are 
international in life, but national in death” summarizes perfectly the problem in such a 
situation. If supervision and resolution are at the national level, the risk that the countries’ 
authorities consider and rescue only the domestic share of a bank’s business is quite high. In 
this way, it would cause both inefficient and detrimental consequences for systemic stability. 
On the contrary, particularly high inward cross-border claims characterized the central and 
eastern non-euro countries. Czech Republic and Croatia have been documented to have the 
highest share, about 80% of foreign-owned subsidiaries from members of the Banking Union. 
For Bulgaria, Romania, Poland the share is reduced to almost 60%, while for Hungary is around 
40%. The United Kingdom has also high inward cross-border activities, but the majority of 
claims come from banks headquartered outside the EU. In fact, London represents the gateway 
to Europe for the large US and Swiss investment banks. This manifests its importance as an 
international financial centre, that would gain intensified cooperation by joining the Banking 
Union. However, its recent decision to exit from the European Union made the arrangement 
impossible. A Banking Union that does not contain the U.K. is expected to generate regulatory 
and political problems more than economic ones. Likewise, Sweden declared that it does not 
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have the intention to take part in the project, even if joining the Banking Union would mean 
increased effectiveness and efficiency of supervision and resolution procedures. (Economics 
and financial affairs, 2016). However, the Banking Union can possibly still succeed even 
without their participation, as long as there is sufficient coordination between the national 
institutions and those of the Banking Union. 
By contrast, the decision to join the Banking Union is just a matter of time for all the countries 
that planned to adopt the single currency. Indeed, Bulgaria and Romania are convinced about 
adhering to it. In July 2014, Kalin Hristov, the Bulgarian Minister of Finance, declared that 
both the scheduled asset quality review and the stress test of banks will put his country in a 
position to join the EU’s Banking Union. He emphasized a rapid entry in order to boost the trust 
in the banking system given the fact that the poor supervision led to the collapse of a major 
Bulgarian bank (Tsolova & Williams, 2015). Similarly, in a speech in Rome on July 2014, 
Mugur Isărescu., the Governor of the Romanian National Bank, set out several arguments in 
favour of a quick adherence to the Banking Union, through the close cooperation arrangement. 
First, Romanian domestic banking sector is mostly dominated by banks headquartered in the 
euro area. The Banking Union membership would also discourage the deleveraging on the part 
of banks with foreign capital and help to build a more competitive market by removing 
distortions and entry barriers. Moreover, there could be potential benefits which relate to 
eliminating the possibilities of jurisdictional arbitrage.  
Finally, not opting for the Banking Union may involve substantial costs for non-euro area 
countries, since they are exposed to contagion effects. If troubles materialise, they can only rely 
on their own mechanisms, resources and instruments, which might not be up to the job 
(Isărescu, 2014). Similar arguments could be considered by Denmark, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland, which are the remaining Member States that adopted a wait and see 
approach (Figure 8). These attitudes to postpone the decision are often encouraged by the 
immature structure of the Banking Union so far. Evaluating the initial performances of the new 
Banking Union mechanisms and the experiences of the earliest opt-in countries will be decisive 
for non-euro countries to determine whether to join or not. In general, for central and eastern 
Europe countries, the Banking Union would represent a more stable configuration for managing 
financial stability and conserving lending capacity. The membership would give also more 
regulatory certainties in times of crisis, acting as a coordination tool for all the involved 
countries. Therefore, it is clear that broaden integration is an expected direction for them. 
However, while the beneﬁts of participation are still only hypothetical and uncertain, risks are 
more evident since not all aspects are favourable from their perspective. In particular, compared 
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to a euro-area member state, an opting-in country would have restricted influence in the 
decision-making process within the SSM, because it would not gain a seat in the Governing 
Council of the ECB, which is the highest decision-making body within the SSM. Other risks 
regard the weaknesses in the construction of the Banking Union. For example, gradual 
mutualisation and the small size of the SRF do not favour the opt-in decision. Moreover, while 
banks of the Eurozone can rely on the ECB liquidity facilities and the ESM funds, opt-ins will 
still depend on their own national backstops. Finally, the level of development of the domestic 
banking sectors, which might be formed by banks “too small to matter”, could be another risk 
for these countries (Belke, et al., 2016).  
 
  
 Source: Hüttl & Schoenmaker, 2016 
 Figure 8: Member States’ positions on joining the Banking Union 
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2. The European regulatory framework for bank recovery and resolution 
2.1. Features of the new resolution framework 
In response to the financial crisis of 2007-08, global leaders initiated an extensive reform 
program of the banking framework regulation. Many motivations were behind the choices of 
policy makers. First of all, in order to reduce systemic risk, macro-prudential supervisors and 
systemic risk boards were established at the national, European and global levels. Then, to 
further decrease the probability of banks default, policy makers increased the prudential 
requirements and decided to improve the quality of capital and supervision, with new 
institutions and tools. However, since the possibility of a bank failure can never be totally 
excluded, leaders proposed also to expand the competences of authorities with a new resolution 
process, which is meant to minimize the negative impact on taxpayers, financial markets and 
the economy. Indeed, given their special nature, banks are highly exposed in times of crisis. 
Bank’s activities, that are vital for the economy, are based on the confidence of depositors and 
other counterparties, which could be rapidly lost if the bank is not able to maintain its promises. 
In addition, if there is the perception that the financial institutions will always be rescued by 
their governments, banks will develop moral hazard behaviours, by taking more and more 
excessive risky positions, thus raising the possibility of default. Moreover, as a result of the 
interconnection of the financial system, the expected failure and insolvency of a bank may result 
in the instability of the whole financial system. For these reasons, a regulation giving the 
possibility to default, is essential in the Banking Union to solve the “Too-Big-To-Fail” problem 
and increase the confidence of depositors and other counterparties. In fact, “in order to avoid 
moral hazard, any failing institution should be able to exit the market, irrespective of its size 
and interconnectedness, without causing systemic disruption” (BRRD, Recital 45). The new 
rules represent an effective alternative to the normal procedures and they help to preserve the 
value that might otherwise be destroyed.  
The ordinary bankruptcy procedures managed in courts may take many years to be completed, 
since they aim to maximise the assets value of a failed business in the interest of creditors. They 
also typically involve the interruption of critical functions of the institution that, in the context 
of a bank, could affect the protection of depositors, which in turn alter financial stability. 
However, usual bankruptcy trials, which remain regulated at the national level, should act as a 
benchmark for the national authorities. Indeed, “failing institution should in principle be 
liquidated under normal insolvency proceedings” (BRRD, recital 45). Only if specific 
conditions are fulfilled, certain objectives are pursued and some principles are observed, banks 
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are put under the new resolution regime. As regards the condition, designated authorities must 
verify that the bank is failing or likely to fail, there are not alternative private solutions and the 
resolution action is necessary in the public interest. In particular, an institution is deemed failing 
or likely to fail when it infringes, or will, in the near future, infringe the requirements for 
keeping the authorization by the competent authority, when the assets of the institution are or 
will be less than its liabilities, when the institution is or will be unable to pay its debts as they 
fall due or when, excluding some circumstances, the extraordinary public financial support is 
required. When the first condition is fulfilled, the resolution process continues only if there is 
not the realistic possibility that any private alternative would avoid the bank resolution within 
a reasonable timeframe. We will see, for example, that early intervention measures and the 
write‐down or conversion of relevant capital instruments may prevent the failure. At the same 
time, also the third condition must be satisfied. The legislation states that there is public interest 
when the resolution “is necessary for the achievement of and is proportionate to one or more 
of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31 and winding up of the institution under 
normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives to the same extent” 
(BRRD, Article 32).  
Indeed, the resolution must pursue a set of objectives, specifically provided by the BRRD. In 
particular, the process must ensure the continuity of critical functions, avoid a significant 
adverse effect on the financial system and protect covered depositors, covered investors, client 
funds and client assets, as well as public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public 
financial support. During the resolution process, the authorities should choose the tools and 
powers to best achieve these objectives. At the same time, when pursuing the above objectives, 
the resolution authority should minimise the cost of resolution and avoid destruction of value, 
except when it is necessary to achieve them. Unless differently specified, the resolution 
objectives are taken into account with equal significance and resolution authorities should 
balance them as appropriate to the nature and circumstances of each case (BRRD, Article 31).  
In addition to conditions and objectives, the BRRD determines a set of general principles, which 
must be observed in all the measures implemented using the resolution tools and powers. In 
particular, since the rights of shareholders and creditors, enjoying strong national legal 
protection, might be affected, Article 34 of the BRRD includes some principles to guarantee 
that resolution procedure is compatible with the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
the safeguards provided by the national legal systems. For example, the legislative text says 
that “the shareholders of the institution under resolution bear first losses and creditors of the 
institution under resolution bear losses after the shareholders in accordance with the order of 
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priority of their claims under normal insolvency proceedings”, except when expressly provided 
otherwise. Another principle is that the management body and senior management, which must 
provide all necessary assistance, should be replaced, unless managers’ retention is considered 
necessary for the realisation of the resolution objectives. Last but not least, covered deposits 
must be fully protected and creditors of the same class must be treated in an equitable manner. 
More importantly, creditors must not bear greater losses than they would have incurred if the 
institution had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings. This last principle, known 
as the ’no creditor worse off principle’, is meant to fill any lacunae left from the application of 
the preceding ones. Moreover, as provide by Article 74 and 75 of the BRRD, shareholder, 
creditor or the deposit guarantee scheme that have incurred in greater losses have the right to 
receive the payment of the difference from the resolution financing arrangements, after that an 
ex-post and independent valuation is carried out. 
Keeping in mind the principles and objective, authorities are supplied with a full collection of 
resolution powers to manage the crisis of a bank that met the condition for resolution. In 
particular, the most important power for resolution authorities is the right to write down and/or 
convert to equity certain liabilities of the bank. First of all, if the amount of write‐down or 
conversion of capital instruments is enough to recapitalize the institution, they can be carried 
out without initiating resolution procedures. In other words, this power may be exercised 
independently or in combination with a resolution action. Besides the situation in which the 
conditions for resolution have been met, the write down or conversion power can be applied 
also if extraordinary financial support is required or if the appropriate authority determines that, 
unless the relevant capital instruments are written down or converted, the institution will no 
longer be viable (BRRD, Article 59). Moreover, the resolution authorities are obliged to 
“exercise the write down or conversion power in accordance with the priority of claims under 
normal insolvency proceedings”, in a way that leads to the utilisation of Common Equity Tier 
1 items first, Additional Tier 1 instruments in second instance and finally Tier 2 instruments, 
all of them in proportion to the losses and to the extent of their capacity. When the principal 
amount of a relevant capital instrument is written down, the reduction must be permanent, no 
liability to the holder of the relevant capital instrument shall remain under or in connection with 
that amount written down and, generally, no compensation should be paid to any holder of the 
relevant capital instruments (BRRD, Article 60).  
However, against a decision to take a crisis management measure, Member States shall provide 
the right of appeal. BRRD provides that the review of the decision must expeditious and that 
national courts should use “the complex economic assessments of the facts carried out by the 
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resolution authority as a basis for their own assessment”. Moreover, since the new regulatory 
framework for resolution is meant to manage situations of extreme urgency and any suspension 
of the decision process might obstruct the continuity of critical functions, the appeal must not 
entail any automatic suspension of the effects of the challenged decision, but it should be 
immediately enforceable and it shall give rise to a contestable presumption that a suspension 
would be against the public interest. In addition, the invalidation of a decision cannot “affect 
any subsequent administrative act or transaction concluded by the resolution authority”, in 
order to protect the rights of third parties that purchased in good faith shares, assets, rights and 
liabilities of the institution under resolution. In such a case, to remedy a wrongful decision, the 
BRRD requires that the losses suffered by the applicant must be compensates (BRRD, Article 
85). In conclusion, to further protect the rights of many involved counterparties, such as 
shareholders and creditors, the BRRD specifies some rules governing the procedural 
requirements for notification and confidentiality. The resolution framework ensures that 
resolution actions must be properly notified and made public. “However, as information 
obtained by resolution authorities and their professional advisers during the resolution process 
is likely to be sensitive, before the resolution decision is made public, that information should 
be subject to an effective confidentiality regime” (BRRD, Recital 86). Thus, the circulation of 
that information must be controlled with an effective confidentiality regime, before the 
publication of the resolution decision. The persons listed in Article 84 of BRRD are prohibited 
from revealing information obtained during their professional activities or from a competent or 
resolution authority, to any person or authority unless it is necessary in the exercise of their 
functions. 
 
2.2. The distribution of competences among institutions 
The institutional and regulatory framework of the European Banking Union is largely in place.  
The transfer of competences to the SSM and SRM brought greater efficiency and consistency 
in the application of common rules included in the Single Rulebook. However, as shown 
previously, the absence of a common deposit insurance scheme, which is still under discussion, 
is a remaining weakness of the system. In fact, these three pillars are essential and mutually 
dependent for the establishment of a single market for financial services and should be regulated 
at the same level. As regards the SSM, the architecture developed by the Council is based on a 
network composed of European Central Bank and National Competent Authorities (NCAs), 
which ensures that all banks in the euro area are taken into account. The ECB, which is also 
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responsible for the overall functioning of the system, direct supervises 129 banks that are 
deemed as significant according to specific criteria listed by Article 6 of SSM Regulation. In 
particular, the day-to-day supervision of significant institutions is carried out by dedicated Joint 
Supervisory Teams (JSTs), whose size varies depending on the nature, complexity, scale, 
business model and risk profile of the credit institution. They comprise representatives from 
both the ECB and the NCAs of the countries in which the credit institutions, banking 
subsidiaries or the significant cross-border branches of a given banking group are located. 
Banks that do not satisfy the criteria to be significant remain supervised by their NCAs, in close 
cooperation with the ECB. However, at any time the ECB can decide to directly supervise any 
one of these “less significant” institutions to ensure that high supervisory standards are applied 
consistently.  
Similarly to the SSM, the structural organization of the SRM is based on a network which split 
the competences between a central agency, the Single Resolution Board, and national resolution 
authorities (NRAs). Article 3 of the BRRD requires that each member state has to establish a 
national resolution authority that is invested with a bunch of resolution powers. The legislator 
expressly provides that they could be “national central banks, competent ministries or 
authorities entrusted with public administrative powers”. There is the exceptional possibility 
that a NRA might coincide with a NCA. However, there are also a number of requirements 
needed to ensure operational independence and avoid conflicts of interest between the 
supervision and resolution functions. Then, to ensure financial stability and a consistent 
application of rules, the BRRD makes clear that the resolution regime should be applied to the 
same institutions subject to prudential requirements and supervision (BRRD, Recital 11). 
Therefore, the resolution framework is not only applied to credit institutions, but also to 
investment firms, financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies, mixed-
activity holding companies and subsidiaries of one of the entities just citied, covered by the 
supervision of the parent undertaking on a consolidated basis (BRRD, Article 1). Thus, the SRB 
manages, in close cooperation with NRAs, the resolution framework of significant entities or 
groups subject to the supervision of the ECB, as well as any cross-border group established 
within a country of the Banking Union. On the other hand, in relation to the less significant 
institutions supervised by NCAs, NRAs directly exercise resolution powers. Nonetheless, every 
time the resolution action resort to the Single Resolution Fund, the resolution scheme has to be 
adopted by the Board. In addition to these cases, if the Board believes that a NRA undertook a 
draft decision that does not comply with the Regulation or the Board’s general instructions, it 
can issue a warning to the authority. At any time, just like the ECB, the SRB is able to exercise 
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directly all of the relevant powers under the Regulation, especially if the warning is not taken 
into consideration. The general rule within the SRM is that decisions should be taken at the 
most appropriate level. In particular, when approving their measures, “the Board and the 
national resolution authorities should apply the same material rules” (SRM Regulation, Recital 
23). In any case, after a resolution scheme has been adopted, the NRAs are responsible to carry 
out its implementation, following the national legal system. NRAs must inform and coordinate 
with the Board about the actions that they are willing to take and implement. In addition, NRAs 
can be requested by the SRB to adopt the necessary measures to remove obstacles to 
resolvability and determines the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities 
(MREL), which will be analysed later. Moreover, besides crisis management SRB is entitled of 
some responsibilities in the other phases set out by the BRRD, such as in the preparation and 
crisis prevention. In particular, during the preparation process, the SRB draws up resolution 
plans for the entities and groups for which it is the resolution authority, after consulting the 
ECB or the relevant NCAs and the NRAs. In the early intervention phase, if the SRB is informed 
of prevention measures taken by ECB or NCAs, it has to notify the Commission and prepares 
itself for the possible resolution of the institution or group concerned.  
Depending on the subject under consideration, the Board operates in executive and plenary 
sessions, in order to take its decisions. The executive session prepares all decisions concerning 
the resolution procedure and directly takes the decisions relating to individual entities or 
banking groups if the use of the Single Resolution Fund remains below €5 billion. In this case 
the Board is composed by five permanent members, which are chosen among experts and 
appointed by the European Parliament on the proposal of the Commission, the observers from 
the Commission and the ECB and the representatives of the NRAs, but only those concerned 
with the failing institution. Differently, the plenary session of the Board is composed by all the 
NRAs, in addition to permanent members and observers. Indeed, it takes all decisions of general 
nature and the decisions relating to individual entities falling outside the competence of the 
executive session. As regards the voting system, during the executive section, each member, 
except from observers, has one vote and if a consensus is not reached within the deadline set 
by the Chair, the decision is taken under a simple majority rule by the five permanent members. 
Instead, for the plenary section, special majority rules are provided for the most sensitive issues, 
such as the decision on the necessity to raise extraordinary ex-post contributions, on the 
voluntary borrowing between financing arrangements, on alternative financing arrangements 
and on the mutualisation of national financing arrangements in the case of group resolutions. 
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2.3. The resolution process  
The SRB plays a crucial role during the assessment of the condition necessary to take a 
resolution action. Following the SRM Regulation, the opening of a resolution procedure is made 
with the assessment of the first condition, the failing or likely to fail, which is normally carried 
out by the ECB, after having consulted the Board. The Executive Board may also make this 
assessment if it informs the ECB about this intention and within 3 days ECB does not make it. 
Then, the Board in executive session makes the assessment of the second and third condition. 
These decisions are taken by the SRB in close cooperation with the ECB, or, when applicable, 
by the NRAs, in close cooperation with the ECB. If the SRB judges that all the three conditions 
for resolution are met, the entity is put under resolution and the adopted resolution scheme 
defines the application of the resolution tools and the eventual use of the SRF to support the 
resolution actions. In fact, SRB is the owner and administrator of the SFR. The modalities for 
the use of the Fund are established by the provisions on financing arrangements of the BRRD 
and are integrated by the SRM Regulation. In general, only when the resources from 
shareholders and creditors are exhausted, the losses, costs and expenses incurred with the 
resolution tools can be supported by the SRF. Whenever the Fund is involved in the resolution 
of a bank, the SRB has to notify the Commission which check the compatibility of its use in the 
respect of the rules on State aid. As soon as a resolution scheme is adopted by the SRB, it is 
immediately transmitted to the Commission to be reviewed. The Commission can endorse the 
scheme, and therefore it enters into force. Otherwise within 24 hours, if the commission objects 
Figure 9: Resolution process 
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to discretionary aspects of the scheme, the SRB must modify decision within 8 hours, in 
accordance with the new requirements. Instead, the Commission has only 12 hours if the 
revision regards the amount of SRF contribution or the absence of the public interest condition. 
In both cases, the Council has 12 hours to assess Commission’s objection. If the objection about 
the SRF utilization is adopted, SRB must modify the resolution scheme within 8 hours, taking 
into account the Commission and/or Council requirements. If the Council agrees that the 
resolution scheme doesn’t fulfil the criterion of public interest, the bank must be wound up in 
an orderly manner under national law. On the other hand, if the objections are refused, the 
scheme enters into force. After the decision is final, the SRB instructs the relevant national 
resolution authorities to take the necessary measures to implement the resolution scheme.  
  
2.4. The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive  
Given the legal and technical impossibility to harmonize insolvency laws in all the Member 
States, policy makers opted to centralize the decisions on starting resolution, keeping the 
national authorities responsible for their implementation under the national legal systems. In 
such a context the BRRD provides a set of common rules for the recovery and resolution 
process. In particular, BRRD not only offers a rich toolbox for crisis management, but also for 
Source: European Council  
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crisis prevention and early intervention. First of all, following this three‐step approach, its rules 
are meant to guarantee that banks and authorities are sufficiently prepared in case of crisis, by 
developing timely recovery and resolution plans (BRRD, Title 2: Preparation). Furthermore, 
when problems emerge, the BRRD equips the competent authorities with the tools to take a 
timely corrective action (BRRD, Title 3: Early intervention). Finally, others powers and tools 
are provided to authorities in order to manage the bank crisis and protect depositors and 
taxpayers, (BRRD, Title 4: Crisis management). 
2.4.1. Preparation  
a. Recovery Planning  
Article 5 of BRRD states that each institution, that is not part of a group, is required to “draw 
up and maintains a recovery plan providing for measures to be taken by the institution to restore 
its financial position following a significant deterioration of its financial situation”. 
Alternatively, Article 7 states that the parent undertakings must “draw up and submit to the 
consolidating supervisor a group recovery plan”, which contains “measures that may be 
required to be implemented at the level of the Union parent undertaking and each individual 
subsidiary”, to achieve the stabilisation of the group as a whole, or any institution of the group. 
As regards the requirements, the recovery plans must be updated at least annually or every time 
that the legal or organizational structure of the bank, as well as its business or financial situation, 
is subject to a relevant change. Then, a specific set of information, listed in Section A of the 
Annex of BRRD, should be included in the recovery plans. These plans should contemplate a 
wide range of scenarios of severe macroeconomic and financial stress relevant to the 
institution’s specific conditions, both system-wide events and specific to individual legal 
persons or groups. Moreover, plans cannot presuppose any access to the extraordinary public 
financial support, but it should analyse how and when an institution may apply for the use of 
central bank facilities and identify the assets suitable to qualify as collateral 
After being assessed and approved by the management body, the financial institution must 
submit their plans to the competent supervisory authority, which consult competent authorities 
of the significant branches and, for banking groups, the competent authorities where 
subsidiaries are located. In this case, the competent authorities of subsidiaries have to reach, 
within four months, a joint decision with the consolidating supervisor on the review of group 
recovery plan, whether to draw a recovery plan for individual entity and the application of 
measures at subsidiary level (BRRD, Article 8). The recovery plan is also submitted to the 
resolution authority and for groups to resolution authorities where subsidiaries are located. They 
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may make recommendations to the competent authority if they identify that some of the 
measures contemplated could adversely impact the resolvability of the institution. Successively, 
the competent authority must assess within six months if the plan, in addition to the general 
requirements, is adequate to maintain or restore the institution’s viability and financial position 
and if it can be implemented quickly and effectively to avoid adverse effect on the financial 
system. During the assessment of the recovery plans suitability, the competent authority has to 
take into account the risk profile of the institution, its capital and funding structure and the 
complexity of the organisational structure. In the presence of such material deficiencies and/or 
impediments to resolvability in the recovery plan, the institution or the parent undertaking of 
the group has to submit a revised plan demonstrating how those problems were addressed, 
within two months or exceptionally three months. If there are still deficiencies, or the plan was 
not submitted, the competent authority can direct the financial institution to make specific 
changes to the plan or, if this is not possible, it can require the institution to identify changes to 
its business. Again, if the institution fails to do so, the competent authority can direct the 
institution to reduce the risk profile of the institution, enable timely recapitalisation measures, 
review the institution’s strategy and structure and make changes to the funding strategy and 
governance structure in order to address the deficiencies in or impediments to the 
implementation of the recovery plan (Figure 10). 
Figure 10: Assessment process for recovery plans  
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In conclusion, for the purpose of these rules, Article 9 state that “the competent authorities shall 
require that each recovery plan includes a framework of indicators established by the 
institution which identifies the points at which appropriate actions referred to in the plan may 
be taken”. The nature of indicators could be qualitative or quantitative, and shall be easily 
monitored, with the institutions putting in place appropriate arrangements for this task. A 
feature of the quantitative indicators is that, through a progressive metrics, they allow for 
gradual awareness of the institution before having to consider whether to take the actions 
referred to the recovery plan. In any case, the decision to take or refrain from taking an action, 
whether or not the relevant indicator has been met, shall be notified to the competent authority 
without delay. EBA (2015) specified the minimum list of categories and respective qualitative 
and quantitative indicators, which should be included in all recovery plans. There are four main 
categories (capital, liquidity, profitability and asset quality) and two other categories (market-
based indicators and macroeconomic indicators) that should be included in the recovery plan 
unless the institution justifies to the competent authorities that they are not relevant to its legal 
structure, risk profile, size and/or complexity. However, the Guidelines provide also a list with 
additional recovery plan indicators for illustration purposes only, since institutions should not 
limit their set of indicators to the minimum list.  
b. Resolution Planning  
When the institution meets the conditions for resolution, authorities must be prepared to 
effectively apply the powers and tools provided by the BRRD in order to pursue the resolution 
objectives. Therefore, Article 10 of the BRRD provides that, after having consulted the 
resolution authorities of significant branches, the resolution authority is required to draw up a 
resolution plans for the institution. Similarly, Article 12 obliges group-level resolution 
authorities to draw up group resolution plans, which include a plan for the group as a whole and 
for the parent and subsidiary entities. The group level resolution authority and the subsidiary 
resolution authorities form the resolution college, which have to reach a joint decision on 
drawing up and maintaining resolution plan. Group-level resolution authorities may, at their 
discretion, involve third-country resolution authorities of jurisdictions in which the group has 
established subsidiaries or financial holding companies or significant branches. In the absence 
of a joint decision between the resolution authorities within four months, the group-level 
resolution authority shall make its own decision on the group resolution plan and each 
resolution authority responsible for a subsidiary shall make its own decision and shall draw up 
and maintain a resolution plan for the entities under its jurisdiction. However, if they referred 
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the matter to EBA, resolution authorities must take the decision in accordance with EBA 
decision, which should be formulated within one month (BRRD, Article 13). 
Like recovery plans, also “resolution plans shall be reviewed, and where appropriate updated, 
at least annually and after any material changes to the structure of the institution or to its 
business and financial position that could have a material effect on the effectiveness of the plan 
or otherwise necessitates a revision of the resolution plan”. These plans require also 
confidentiality protection, since they may include highly sensitive information. In fact, 
resolution authorities have the power to oblige institutions to cooperate as much as necessary 
in the drawing up of resolution plans and to supply, either directly or through the competent 
authority, all of the necessary information to draw up and implement resolution plans (BRRD, 
Article 11). The resolution plan, which are be prepared on the basis of these information, must 
contain, for example, a detailed description of the different resolution strategies that could be 
applied according to the different possible scenarios and to the available timeframe for 
executing the plan. Moreover, the resolution plan shall include a demonstration of how critical 
functions and core business lines could be legally and economically separated from other tasks 
to ensure continuity, as well as a description of the processes for determining the value and 
marketability of the critical functions, core business lines and assets of the institution. In 
addition, an explanation of how the resolution options could be financed should be included in 
the plan, without assuming any extraordinary public financial support or any central bank 
emergency liquidity assistance. The resolution plan shall instead include an analysis of how and 
when an institution may apply for the use of central bank facilities, identifying which assets 
qualify as collateral. The BRRD requires also that the plan should analyse the impact of 
implementation on the employees of the institution and describe the procedures to consult staff 
during the resolution process, taking into account national systems for dialogue with social 
partners where applicable. In conclusion, the plan must include a detailed description of both 
the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities required pursuant to Article 45, 
which will be presented later, and the assessment of resolvability any measures required to 
address or remove impediments to it, which are identified in accordance with Article 15. 
c. Resolvability  
“An institution, or a group, is deemed to be resolvable if it is feasible and credible for the 
resolution authority to either liquidate it under normal insolvency proceedings or to resolve it 
by applying the different resolution tools and powers” (BRRD, Article 15). In fact, the 
institution, or the group, should avoid any significant adverse effect on the financial system and 
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ensure the continuity of critical functions carried out by the institution or by the group entities. 
For the purposes of the assessment of resolvability, the BBRD stresses that it must be carried 
out without any assumption of extraordinary public financial support or central bank emergency 
or non-standard liquidity assistance. The legislative text provides the circumstances that the 
resolution authority shall examine. For example, it should consider the extent to which there 
are arrangements in place to provide for essential staff, infrastructure, funding, liquidity and 
capital to support and maintain the core business lines and the critical operations, the capacity 
of the management information systems to provide the information essential for the effective 
resolution of the institution at all times even under rapidly changing conditions, the amount and 
type of eligible liabilities of the institution and the credibility of using resolution tools in such 
a way which meets the resolution objectives, given possible impacts on creditors, 
counterparties, customers and employees and possible actions that third-country authorities 
may take.  
When a resolution authority determines that there are substantive barriers to the resolvability 
of the institution, it shall notify the institution, the competent authority, the resolution 
authorities of the jurisdictions in which significant branches are located and also EBA in a 
timely manner. The institution has to propose, within four months, some possible measures in 
order to eliminate the impediments identified in the notification. The resolution authority, after 
consulting the competent authority, will assess if those actions are suitable to remove 
impediments, otherwise it will require the institution to take other measures, either directly or 
through competent authorities. For example, such measures may include the limitation of the 
institution’s maximum individual and aggregate exposures, the divestiture of specific assets, 
the limitation or ceasing of specific activities, the changing of the legal or operational structure 
and the compliance with minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities. A 
specific and more complex provision governs the assessment of resolvability for groups. The 
group-level resolution authority shall communicate any measure proposed by the Union parent 
undertaking to the consolidating supervisor, to EBA, to the resolution authorities of the 
subsidiaries and to the resolution authorities of significant branches. They shall do everything 
within their power to reach a joint decision on identifying material impediments and the 
application of alternative measures for all institutions of the group. In the absence of consensus, 
an own decision on alternative measures should be taken by group level resolution authority or 
by the resolution authorities of subsidiaries. EBA may, upon the request of a resolution 
authority, assist the resolution authorities in reaching an agreement, in a similar way of the 
group resolution plan. 
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d. Intra group financial support  
Preparing for a worsening of the financial conditions consists also in the possibility for 
institutions belonging to the same cross‐border group to “enter into an agreement to provide 
financial support to any other party that meets the conditions for early intervention” (BRRD, 
Article 19). The group financial support may be provided in the form of a loan, the provision 
of guarantees, the provision of assets for use as collateral or any combination of those forms of 
financial support, in one or more transactions. The idea behind intra‐group financial support is 
to safeguard the financial stability of the group as a whole, without jeopardizing the liquidity 
or solvency of the group, given the strong interdependencies between the entities of the same 
group. The BBRD provides that intra group financial support agreements must be finalised ex‐
ante, before the parties fulfilled the conditions for early intervention. Each party must be acting 
freely in entering into the agreement and in its own best interests. The agreement is also subject 
to prior authorization by the competent supervisory authorities, which will check whether the 
conditions are met. In case of disagreement between different authorities of different entities 
the EBA can provide assistance through its mediation powers. Then, competent authorities shall 
transfer the agreements that they authorised to the relevant resolution authorities. In addition, 
any proposed agreement must be submitted to the shareholders of every group institution, 
otherwise it shall be valid only between those entities whose shareholders have approved it. 
2.4.2. Early intervention  
After the preparation phase, the BRRD offers, to the competent supervisory authorities, the 
possibility to act with special powers when there are signals of financial distress and before 
there is no alternative than to resolve the bank. When the financial structure of a bank is 
weakening and the competent authority establishes that conditions for early intervention are 
met, it shall notify the resolution authority without delay. Then, for each of the measures 
adopted during this stage, competent authorities are required to set an appropriate deadline for 
completion and to evaluate the effectiveness of the measure.  
Article 27 of the BRRD lists the early intervention measures that competent authorities can 
implement during this stage. For example, they have the power to convene directly or force the 
management body of the institution to convene a meeting of shareholders. They can require the 
management of the institution to implement some of the measures set out in the recovery plan 
or, alternatively, modify the plan and implement a new and updated one, to ensure that the 
conditions that triggered the early intervention no longer apply. Moreover, the management 
body of the institution is required to examine the situation, to identify the measures needed to 
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overcome any problem. Based on these information, it should draw an action programme, with 
a timetable for its implementation and also a plan for negotiation on restructuring of debt. 
Alternatively, competent authorities can impose changes to institution’s business strategy, legal 
or operational structures and may acquire also through on-site inspections all the information 
necessary to the resolution authority to update the resolution plan and for valuation of the assets 
and liabilities. Finally, those members of management who are found unfit to perform of their 
duties can be removed or replaced. However, when this replacement is considered insufficient 
to remedy the situation, authorities may appoint one or more temporary administrators, who 
replace the management body or works with it (BRRD, Article 28-29). The competent authority 
must specify in advance the role, duties and powers of the temporary administrator, which are 
meant to preserve or repair the financial position of the entity and restore a sound and prudent 
management. The competent authority can remove the temporary administrator at any time and 
for any reason. Normally, its role cannot last more than one year. However, the period may be 
exceptionally renewed, if the conditions continue to be met.  
In fact, early intervention measures might be implemented only if the conditions provided by 
Article 27 apply. First, an institution must infringe or is likely in the near future to infringe the 
requirements of relevant EU and national implementing legislation. Second, based on the 
assessment of a set of triggers, there must be a rapidly deteriorating financial condition, whit 
respect to the liquidity situation, the growth level of leverage and non-performing loans or the 
concentration of exposures. Given the risk that Member States would apply different practices 
in assessing the conditions, EBA (2015), published the Guidelines to promote a consistent 
application of triggers for the decision to apply early intervention measures. The core problem 
that these Guidelines want to address is the absence of common rules and practices in applying 
early intervention measures by competent authorities throughout the EU. First of all, the 
Guidelines do not establish any quantitative thresholds for indicators, since they could be 
perceived as new levels for regulatory requirements for capital or liquidity, and the triggers do 
not oblige competent authorities to automatically apply early intervention measures in all cases. 
Likewise, competent authorities can avoid to apply early intervention measures where such 
triggers are not met, but they see a clear need for them. Moreover, all these events, together 
with the reasons for taking or not a measure and the further investigations, should be clearly 
documented by the competent authorities. 
The triggers established on the EBA’s document are closely linked to the outcomes of the 
common Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) conducted by the competent 
authorities. SREP, that is one of the major components of the second pillar of Basel II, has a 
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structure built around the assessments of the business model, the internal governance and risk 
management, the risks to capital and the risks to liquidity. Each of these four specific 
components are evaluated on a scale going from 1, meaning no noticeable risk, to 4, which 
implicate high risk. The outcomes of these assessments are at basis for the overall SREP 
assessment, which represents the up-to-date supervisory view of the institution's risks and 
viability. Similarly, the overall SREP score has four positive grades, 1 to 4, and also one 
negative grade indicating that the institution has been classified failing or likely to fail and that 
the procedure for resolution should be activated. Therefore, triggers for early intervention based 
on the scores of the assessment of various SREP elements and the Overall SREP, can be used 
to identify any threat to the viability of an institution and the condition of Article 27. In 
particular, with an overall SREP score of 4 assigned to an institution, the competent authority 
should take a decision on whether to apply early intervention measures, without undue delay. 
The competent authority should also consider to take early intervention measures when the 
Overall SREP score is 3 and the assessment of one of the individual SREP elements result in a 
score of 4.  
Alternatively, the guidelines recognise that the early intervention triggers can be constructed 
upon other circumstances, which are not included into the outcomes of the SREP assessment. 
For example, early intervention can be triggered by material changes or anomalies identified in 
the monitoring of key SREP indicators, but before that their assessment is updated. Moreover, 
measures could be also triggered by significant events that could put the institution into a 
situation where conditions for early intervention are met relatively rapidly. Examples of these 
events may be major operational risk events, such as dishonest trading, fraud, natural disaster, 
severe IT problems and significant fines imposed on the institutions by public authorities. Then, 
other significant events to be considered are the deterioration in the amount of eligible liabilities 
and own funds for the purposes of MELR, the unexpected loss of senior management or key 
staff, the downgrades by one or more external rating agencies and the need to review the quality 
of assets following a reputational damage of the institution. 
2.4.3. Crisis management  
a. Special management  
When the situation deteriorates beyond repair, the third part of the BRRD provides a mechanism 
through which an administrative procedure may be initiated in order to manage the crisis of the 
institution or group. Chapter 1 of this Title presents the objectives, the conditions and the 
general principles governing the resolution process, which have been already analysed. In the 
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second chapter instead, the BRRD establishes that the resolution authority should have the 
power to appoint a special manager, in order to replace the management body of the institution 
under resolution. The special manager, whose appointment must be made public, should have 
the qualifications, ability and knowledge to carry out his functions. Under the control of the 
resolution authority, he can exercise all the powers of the shareholders and the management 
body, who no longer retain responsibility and control of the institution. The special manager 
has the statutory duty to take all the necessary measures to promote the resolution objectives 
and implement resolution actions. He is required to draw up reports on the economic and 
financial situation and on the acts he performed. Nonetheless, resolution authorities can set 
limits to the action of a special manager or require that his actions are subject to the resolution 
authority’s prior consent. Like the temporary administrator appointed in the early intervention 
phase, the resolution authorities may remove the special manager at any time and his mandate 
should not last more than one year, although it can be renewed on an exceptional basis. In 
conclusion, with respect to banking groups, resolution authorities shall decide whether it is 
more appropriate to appoint the same special manager for all the entities concerned or more 
special managers (BRRD, Article 35). 
b. Valuation for the purposes of resolution  
“Before taking resolution action or exercising the power to write down or convert relevant 
capital instruments, resolution authorities shall ensure that a fair, prudent and realistic 
valuation of the assets and liabilities of the institution […] is carried out by a person 
independent from any public authority, including the resolution authority, and the institution” 
(BRRD, Article 36). In fact, the valuation is needed to provide information in many 
circumstances, such as during the determination of the conditions for resolution and for the 
decision on the appropriate resolution action to be taken. Through the valuation, any losses on 
the assets of the institution are fully recognised at the moment that resolution tools are applied 
or the power to write down or convert relevant capital instruments is exercised. When an 
independent valuation is not possible due to the urgency in the circumstances of the case, 
resolution authorities may carry out a provisional valuation of the assets and liabilities of the 
institution, which will be accompanied as soon as possible by an ex‐post definitive valuation. 
A valuation that does not comply with all the requirements is also considered to be provisional, 
until an independent person carries out, as soon as practicable, a fully compatible valuation. As 
regards the requirements, the valuation must be based on prudent assumptions and shall not 
assume any potential future provision of extraordinary public financial support or central bank 
emergency liquidity assistance. The valuation must also indicate the subdivision of the creditors 
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in classes in accordance with their priority levels under the applicable insolvency law and 
estimate the treatment that each class of shareholders and creditors would have been expected 
to receive, if the institution were wound up under normal insolvency proceedings. 
c. Resolution tools  
The resolution authorities have at their disposal four resolution tools, which can be applied 
without obtaining the consent of the failing bank’s existing shareholders or any other 
stakeholder and without complying with any procedural requirements under company or 
securities law. They consist in the sale of the business of the institution under resolution, the 
setting up of a bridge institution, the separation of the performing assets from the impaired or 
under‐performing assets of the failing institution and the bail‐in of shareholders and creditors. 
The choice of tools will depend on the specific circumstances of each case and on the options 
laid out in the resolution plan prepared for the bank. In fact, the resolution plan should be 
generally followed by resolution authorities, unless different measures can achieve the 
resolution objectives more effectively. Resolution authorities can employ the tools separately 
or in combination. Moreover, if an institution meets the conditions for resolution, Member 
States may confer additional tools and powers provided that they do not pose obstacles to 
effective group resolution and they are consistent with the resolution objectives and the general 
principles governing resolution (BRRD, Article 37). 
As regards the sale of business tool, authorities have the power to transfer the shares or other 
instruments of ownership issued by an institution under resolution or any of its assets, rights or 
liabilities to one or more purchasers that are not a bridge institution. The transfer shall be made 
on commercial terms that conform the valuation, having regard to the circumstances, and in 
accordance with the Union State aid framework (BRRD, Article 38). Moreover, resolution 
authorities must respect some procedural requirements when putting on sale the assets, rights, 
liabilities, shares or other instruments of ownership that they intend to transfer. This marketing 
must be as transparent as possible, free from any conflict of interest and shall not favour or 
discriminate any potential purchasers. In addition, it shall take into account the need of rapid 
resolution action, having a view of sale price maximization for the items sold. However, the 
compliance with these requirements can be avoided if they are likely to undermine one or more 
resolution objectives, together with a material threat to financial stability and a reduction of the 
effectiveness of the sale of business tool (BRRD, Article 39).  
When an appropriate acquirer cannot be found immediately, the resolution authorities have the 
power to transfer to a bridge institution the instruments of ownership, assets, rights or 
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liabilities of one or more institutions under resolution. The bridge institution shall be a legal 
person that it is wholly or partially owned by one or more public authorities and controlled by 
the resolution authority. It must be created with the purpose of receiving and holding some or 
all of the shares, other instruments of ownership, assets, rights and liabilities, with the objective 
to maintaining access to critical banking functions and selling the institution (BRRD, Article 
40). In addition, the operation of a bridge institution must respect many requirements. The 
bridge institution’s constitutional documents must be approved by the resolution authority, 
which decide also on the nomination or approval, remuneration and responsibilities of the 
management body. The resolution authority approves also the bridge institution’s strategy and 
risk profile. The operations of the bridge institution, which can be restricted by the resolution 
authority, shall in general be carried out in accordance with the Union State aid framework. In 
addition, the bridge institution complies with the requirements and is subject to supervision. 
However, it may be exempted for a short period of time, when it is necessary to meet the 
resolution objectives. The operation of a bridge institution shall be terminated by the resolution 
authority as soon as possible and, in any case, two years after the date on which the last transfer 
to the bridge institution tool was made. Nevertheless, the 2 years-period may extend one or 
more additional one-year periods, provided that some conditions are fulfilled. Alternatively, the 
termination of the bridge institution occurs when the bridge institution merges with another 
entity, when it ceases to meet the requirements of public ownership and scope, when it transfers 
of all or substantially all of its assets, rights or liabilities to a third party or when its assets are 
completely wound down and its liabilities are completely discharged (BRRD, Article 41). For 
the bridge institution tool, but also for the sale of asset tool, the legislation provides that the 
remaining institution, from which the assets, rights or liabilities have been transferred, shall be 
wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, within a reasonable timeframe. Both the 
bridge institution or the purchaser under sale of asset tool are considered to be a continuation 
of the institution under resolution, in order to enable them to carry out the activities or services 
acquired and exercise any right in respect of the assets and liabilities transferred.  
Similarly to the bridge institution, the asset separation tool is designed to avoid further losses 
caused by the immediate forced sale of the failed bank’s portfolio of assets. However, in order 
to avoid undue competitive advantages for the institution, this tool can be used only jointly with 
another resolution tool. In fact, resolution authorities have the power to transfer assets, rights 
or liabilities of an institution under resolution or a bridge institution to one or more asset 
management vehicles, which manage the assets received with a view to maximising their value 
through eventual sale or orderly wind down. Like the bridge institution, the asset management 
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vehicle has the requirements of being owned by one or more public authorities and controlled 
by the resolution authority. Moreover, the same rules apply on its operation, in particular for 
the approval, by the resolution authority, of the constitutional documents, the management body 
and the strategy and risk profile. In addition, there are three conditions that need to be respected 
to use this tool. First, the liquidation of those assets under normal insolvency proceedings must 
not cause an adverse effect on one or more financial markets. Second, the transfer must be 
necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the institution under resolution or bridge 
institution. Third, the separation between clean and toxic assets must be crucial to maximise 
liquidation proceeds (BRRD, Article 42). 
Finally, the last but most important tool, the bail‐in, empowers the resolution authorities to 
force the stakeholders, of a failing or failed bank, to contribute to the financial cost of resolution. 
In accordance with the resolution principles and objectives, the legislation specifies that this 
tool can be applied for the purpose to recapitalise an institution, if there is a reasonable prospect 
that it will restore the institution financial soundness and long-term viability. Otherwise, it may 
serve to convert to equity or reduce claims and debt instruments that are transferred through the 
sale of business, bridge institution or asset separation tools (BRRD, Article 43). The bail‐in tool 
must be applied to all liabilities of an institution, except for those that are specifically excluded. 
In fact, resolution authorities cannot exercise the write down or conversion powers in relation 
to covered deposits, to secured liabilities such as covered bonds and financial instruments used 
for hedging purposes, to liabilities with an original or remaining maturity of less than seven 
days and to any liability owed to employee, commercial or trade creditor, tax and social security 
authorities or deposit guarantee schemes. Generally, liabilities should be excluded if their 
inclusion in the bail-in causes higher losses to other creditors. In addition, the resolution 
authority may exclude or partially exclude certain liabilities from the application of the write-
down or conversion powers in exceptional circumstances. For example, if there is no reasonable 
time to bail-in that liability and when that liability is needed to insure the continuity of critical 
functions or avoid widespread contagion. However, in the case that a resolution authority 
excludes an eligible liability, the level of write down or conversion applied to other eligible 
liabilities must be increased to take account of such exclusions. If the other creditors cannot 
carry the additional burden, a contribution of the resolution financing arrangements is allowed. 
In any case, before exercising the discretion to exclude a liability, the resolution authority must 
notify the Commission which, in order to protect the integrity of the internal market, may 
prohibit the proposed exclusion (BRRD, Article 44).  
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Another task of the resolution authorities is to quantify, on the basis of the valuation, the amount 
of the bail-in, which is composed by the amount of eligible liabilities that must be written down 
to ensure that the net asset value is equal to zero and the amount of eligible liabilities that must 
be converted into shares or other types of capital instruments to restore the Common Equity 
Tier 1 capital ratio (BRRD, Article 46). Then, Article 48 of the BRRD specifies the rules to 
determine the sequence of write down and conversion during the application of the bail-in tool. 
First of all, “when applying the write down or conversion powers, resolution authorities shall 
allocate the losses equally between shares and eligible liabilities of the same rank, except where 
a different allocation of losses amongst liabilities of the same rank is allowed”. In particular, 
Common Equity Tier 1 items must be reduced first in proportion to the losses and to the extent 
of their capacity, through the cancellation or transfer of shares and/or through severe dilution 
of existing shareholders, as a result of the conversion into shares of relevant capital instruments 
or eligible liabilities. If, and only if, the total reduction of losses is less than the previous 
reduction, authorities can reduce the principal amount of Additional Tier 1 instruments to the 
extent required and to the extent of their capacity. With the same principle, authorities will then 
reduce principal amount of Tier 2 instruments. If the total reduction of shares or other 
instruments of ownership and relevant capital instruments is still less than the losses, authorities 
must reduce the principal amount of subordinated debt that is not Additional Tier 1 or Tier 2 
capital in accordance with the hierarchy of claims in normal insolvency proceedings. Finally, 
the last possibility to cover the losses comes from the reduction of the principal amount of the 
rest of eligible liabilities, including the deposits, following the ranking provided by Article 108 
(BRRD, Article 48).  
Since this pecking order is known, institutions could have the incentive to structure their 
liabilities in a way which reduces the risk of bail‐in, weakening its effectiveness. To prevent 
this situation, the Article 45 obliges institutions to meet, at all times, a minimum requirement 
for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL), “calculated as the amount of own funds and 
eligible liabilities expressed as a percentage of the total liabilities and own funds of the 
institution”. There are several condition for a liability to be included in the amount of own funds 
and eligible liabilities. The instrument must be issued and fully paid up, the liability must not 
be owed to, secured by or guaranteed by the institution itself, the purchase of the instrument 
had not to be funded directly or indirectly by the institution, the liability must have a remaining 
maturity of at least one year and the liability does not arise from a derivative. After consulting 
the competent authority, resolution authority will determine the MREL, on the basis of a set of 
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criteria established by the BRRD and the technical regulatory standards further specified by the 
EBA (BRRD, Article 45).   
In conclusion, after the application of the bail-in tool, the management body or the appointed 
person, should develop, within one month, a business reorganisation plan and submit it to the 
resolution authority. In exceptional circumstances, the resolution authority may extend the 
period up to a maximum of two months, if it is necessary to achieve the resolution objectives. 
The reorganization plan must be compatible with the restructuring plan that the institution is 
required to submit to the Commission under the State aid framework. It shall contain a detailed 
diagnosis of the factors that caused the entity to fail or to be likely to fail, a description of the 
measures aimed to restore the long‐term viability and a timetable for the implementation of 
those measures. Then, within one month of the date of submission of the business reorganisation 
plan, the relevant resolution authority shall assess the likelihood of the plan to accomplish its 
objective. If the resolution authority notifies that the plan is not satisfactory, the management 
body shall submit, within two weeks, an amended plan, which must be again approved or 
rejected within one week (BRRD, Article 48).  
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3. Optimal bank recovery 
3.1. The rationale for developing a quantitative metric 
In chapter 2, I described how the BRRD has improved the regulatory attention to the period 
preceding the resolution of a bank. In particular, thanks to the early intervention phase, a bank 
has the possibility to be restored to normal conditions before it is forced to be resolved. As we 
saw, in the Banking Union the ECB or the national competent authorities are provided with a 
set of early intervention powers, which consist, for example, in the implementation of the 
recovery plans and in the write down and/or conversion of capital instruments. Generally, a 
bank recovery is preferred to a bank resolution, since the early management of a likely failing 
bank would help the financial system to additionally mitigate the systemic risk. Therefore, the 
early intervention phase can be seen as the main point of contact between supervision, on one 
hand, and resolution, on the other.  
At the same time, however, the legislation does not clearly specify the criteria that can trigger 
the start of the early intervention phase. To trigger the recovery, Article 27 of BRRD establishes 
that there must be the solid possibility to infringe the requirements of the relevant EU and 
national legislation or a rapidly deteriorating financial condition, with respect to the liquidity 
situation, the growth level of leverage and non-performing loans or the concentration of 
exposures. As one could note, such conditions are largely subjective and formulated in a general 
manner. Thus, during their assessment, it is reasonable to expect that Member States would 
apply diverse practices and, as a result, obtain different outcomes. These divergences can also 
have detrimental effects for the financial system, since they can lead to an uneven playing field 
for institutions. For example, a different treatment of entities belonging to the same cross-border 
group, may force the financial institutions to reduce their operations in countries where the 
regulatory framework is stricter or less predictable and transfer their businesses to jurisdictions 
which have more favourable regulatory frameworks. Moreover, a lack of clarity about the 
determination of such conditions, could bring a competent authority to take an unnecessary 
early intervention measures or, in the opposite case, to reject the implementation of a recovery 
action when it is necessary. Again, these suboptimal supervisory decisions may lead to several 
problems and distortions in the European banking sector.  
In order to avoid such negative implications, the BRRD appointed the European Banking 
Authority to issue some guidelines to facilitate the consistent application of early intervention 
triggers. In fact, the main objective of the EBA’s guidelines regards the promotion of an 
effective and efficient functioning of the EU banking sector. In order to develop, the banking 
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system requires that the competent authorities must use the same rules and practices, especially 
if cross-border cooperation is needed. I already mentioned that, following these guidelines, the 
decision should be taken in connection with the common Supervisory Review and Evaluation 
Process (SREP), which is already conducted by the competent authorities. In alternative, the 
guidelines recommend that the early intervention can be triggered on the basis of other 
circumstances, such as when significant events lead to a rapidly deterioration of financial 
conditions.  
Nevertheless, one of the most important characteristics of the EBA’s guidelines is that they do 
not establish any quantitative factors and thresholds that should be applied by the competent 
authorities. The reasons behind the decision to implement this type of framework are several. 
The most important argument is that, having the decision based exclusively on a quantitative 
threshold could be considered as a new regulatory requirement, both by the institution and the 
market. Thus, in order to avoid negative consequences, institutions would be forced to stay 
above the early intervention threshold. In fact, the market can easily overreact to situations 
when the quantitative threshold is met, or even when it is going to be approached. For instance, 
the intervention of the competent authority will probably cause a reputational damage, which 
can lead ultimately to bank runs. In fact, the recovery is a serious and traumatic situation for 
the management and it should be triggered only when it is vital for the institution. When 
authorities judge whether or not to proceed with the intervention, they may stumble upon the 
possibility of taking the wrong decision. On the one hand, authorities may initiate an 
unnecessary early intervention, while, on the other hand, they may miss a required recovery, 
which could also increase the costs of resolution at a later stage. As we will see later, a part of 
the literature discussion is focused on the balancing between Type I errors, missing a required 
intervention, and Type II errors, initiate an unnecessary intervention. Authorities may have 
different preferences about this trade-off. In EBA’s opinion, taking this decision exclusively 
using a single quantitative threshold may lead to a number of mistakes, because of the 
significant variety across institutions and jurisdictions. 
In contrast with the approach adopted by the EBA, some studies highlighted the potential 
advantages of having a scientific metric through which take the intervention decision. First of 
all, those who proposed the implementation of a quantitative threshold sustain that the 
numerical parameters of the trigger should not be public, whereas the principle whereby this 
trigger is set should be known to all. In this way, the negative effects of a possible reputational 
risk and a subsequent market reaction can be avoided. In second place, a quantitative metric 
could also deal with the problem originated by the unclear conditions of Article 27 of BRRD. 
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In fact, it would increase both the convergence of supervisory activities across jurisdictions, as 
well as the clarity and transparency to market participants and institutions. Last but not least, 
even if this type of models based only on quantitative factors could be time consuming to 
develop, difficult to test and costly to update, they can more effective in reducing Type I and 
Type II errors. 
 
3.2. Literature review 
For all the reasons just described, it seems that the development of an objective metric, 
determining the recovery trigger, should be taken into consideration, especially in the context 
of the Banking Union. One of the most recent and significant attempt has been provided by 
Goodhart and Segoviano (2015). With their paper they tried to address the lack of appropriate 
triggers for the early intervention phase. In fact, it is not always clear when recovery plans or 
actions should be triggered. Although there is a significant discussion on the triggers for 
resolution, the models signalling the need to entry into the recovery stage are not as much as 
developed. 
A first part of the so-called “early-warning” literature focuses on discovering structural 
vulnerabilities and common patterns preceding the financial crises. Several recent research 
papers aimed to analyse bank failures during the global financial crisis. Thus, using proxies for 
CAMELS1 indicators, the majority of these studies exhibit a high success in forecasting the US 
bank failures. The CAMELS rating system, which was introduced by the US regulators in 1979, 
is a supervisory tool used to gauge the robustness of financial institutions on a uniform basis 
and identify those who need special supervisory attention or concern. It plays a central role in 
these accounting-based models, which employ balance-sheets indicators as significant factors 
to predict bank failures. Progressively, other studies expanded the pure accounting-based 
structure with macroeconomic and market price-based indicators, due to their ability to give 
useful predictive information. An overall review of the empirical results of these studies is 
offered by Demyanyk and Hasan (2009) in their article entitled “Financial crises and bank 
failures: a review of prediction methods”. In particular, the authors examined the financial and 
economic circumstances associated with the US subprime mortgage crisis and the subsequent 
global financial distress, which led to severe recessions in many countries. In fact, only a small 
                                                          
1 Acronym for Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management quality, Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity 
to market risk 
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number of studies dealt with the European banking sector, due to data limitations arising from 
relatively few direct bank failures in core Europe. Some of them focused on the optimal level 
of bank capital that an institution should hold to reduce the likelihoods of distress. One example 
is the contribution of Haq and Heaney (2012), who used information for 117 financial 
institutions across 15 European countries, over the period 1996–2010, to develop a model that 
investigates the equity risk. The main result they obtain is that, beside the expected negative 
relationship between bank capital and credit risk, there is also evidence of a non-linear relation. 
In particular, a U-shaped relation suggests that capital regulation may have unintended 
consequences. In the author’s opinion it is possible that, if banks are forced to further increase 
their high level of capital buffer, they may increase also its risk. As a result, they recognised 
that there are limitations to the utility of capital regulation as a channel to decrease the 
possibility of bankruptcy. Similarly, but using a different approach, Miles et al. (2013) 
estimated the costs and benefits for banks of having higher levels of loss absorbing capital. 
Using empirical evidence on UK banks, they defined the optimal level of equity ratios by 
comparing the extra social benefits, from financial stability, with the extra costs applicable to 
financial intermediation. They found that the inflection point, which occurs when benefits 
exceed or are equal to costs, might be much higher than the minimum regulatory requirements. 
Thus, they concluded that the desirable amount of equity capital is larger than the amount that 
banks have held in recent years under the Basel III framework. 
Rather than predicting failures or distresses at the bank level, a second part of the literature 
concentrates on the optimal “early-warning signals” for policymakers. In particular, an 
important concept for these studies is the loss function of policymakers that takes into account 
the costs for preventive action and the relative preferences between missing crises (Type I 
errors) and false alarms (Type II errors). An important empirical finding, achieved by Betz et 
al. (2013), is that their early-warning model, employing only publicly available data, produces 
useful out-of-sample predictions of bank distress, in the period of the global financial crisis. 
Moreover, based on their results, they stated that a policymaker should be significantly more 
worried about committing Type I errors rather than Type II errors. Many studies highlighted 
that, in this trade-off, the former are more important to be minimised than the latter, because of 
the more punitive effects of bank failures. Recovery, instead, is more reversible, therefore some 
Type II errors are allowed. However, since the expropriation of existing ownership rights, 
which may occur with the bank recovery, is a drastic and legally complex measure, it is also 
important to avoid Type II errors. This opinion is shared by Goodhart and Segoviano (2015). 
According to them, the recovery trigger should be fixed at a point that minimizes the 
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combination of both the two types of errors. They argue that their model captures almost all 
banks that are dealing with severe probabilities of default and only few banks which would 
have survived on their own. In fact, an optimal recovery decision should in general regard all 
the banks that would have failed without intervention, and, at the same time, it should not hit 
too many banks that would have survived anyway.  
More in detail, Goodhart and Segoviano (2015) hypothesised an intervention metric built on 
the comparison between the loss absorbing buffers and the potential extreme losses, that are 
driven by the institution’s default probability. By analysing 19 large European and American 
banks between January 2007 and December 2012, they identified the periods in which potential 
losses were equal or larger than the loss absorption buffers. Based on these results, they 
designed a ladder of sanctions2, whose degree of intervention is more and more punitive as the 
loss absorption buffer deteriorates and/or the potential extreme losses increases.  
Therefore, they fixed the recovery threshold when the Distance to Default (DD) is equal to 1,50 
or, equivalently, when the Probability of Default (PD) is 6,68%. In order set such a trigger level, 
they calculated the cumulative frequency of those banks whose potential losses exceeded the 
respective loss absorption buffer. Then, they related those frequencies with the respective level 
of distance to default. By distinguishing the cumulative distributions of solvent and insolvent 
                                                          
2 From the least to the most severe: frequent visit sanction, pecuniary charge sanction, remuneration 
sanction, intervention. 
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Figure 11: Cumulative distribution of banks whose losses were above the buffer  
Source: Goodhart and Segoviano (2015) 
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banks, they could understand how many banks of both categories would have been exopsed to 
early intervention measures. In Figure 11, the distiction is made by using the green line, which 
identifies the percentage of banks that remained solvent, and the red line, which shows the 
percentage of banks that defaulted. Therfore, when a bank satisfies the intervention criterion 
and the distance to default is at least 1,5 (𝐷𝐷 ≤ 1,5), 33% of solvent banks and 85% of insolvent 
banks would have been subject to recovery. As a result, the corresponding Type I error is 15%, 
while type II error is 33%. In other words, only 15% of the insolvent banks would have been 
excluded from recovery, while 33% of solvent banks would have been intervened 
unnecessarily. If the threshold is moved to the right, it is possible to obtain lower type I errors, 
but at the expense of greater type II errors.  
Moreover, by setting this recovery threshold, Goodhart and Segoviano identified the lag that 
there would have been between the intervention and the insolvency announcement of their 4 
defaulting banks. Looking at the date when the threshold was reached, they concluded that 
recovery would have taken place 6 to 8 months before the insolvency. In fact, the recovery 
phase should be triggered long enough before the bank is put under resolution. In this way, 
remedial actions, implemented by managers and supervisors, have better probabilities to take 
effect successfully, to turn the bank around before resolution takes place.  
 
3.3. Model specification  
There are several reasons why for competent authorities it is beneficial to have at their disposal 
a quantitative framework to evaluate the intervention decision. Most importantly, we saw that 
a common framework would increase the convergence of supervisory activities across the 
Member States. Moreover, given the fact that the actual trigger level should be not publicly 
observable, the competent authorities of a certain country or jurisdiction could balance the 
recovery threshold to obtain different combinations of Type I and Type II errors. Indeed, their 
decisions should be based on the characteristics of their banking system and on their own 
preferences, objectives and risk aversion.  
I therefore decide to evaluate an optimal recovery framework for the Italian banking system, in 
order to retrieve more detailed and specific results. My specification is based on the metric 
developed by Goodhart and Segoviano (2015), which owns several qualities. In particular, 
being built on observable, verifiable and objective data, their model is less vulnerable to 
manipulation and more clear and transparent for institutions. In fact, a problem with traditional 
accounting measures, which are adopted by regulatory framework, is that they rarely report the 
55 
 
true value of the institution, due to lag and/or manipulation. Therefore, these measures are not 
suitable in the context of early intervention, where it is essential to have prompt and true 
information. Later, we will see the different approaches to obtain the parameters of interest, 
which are needed to take the intervention decision. An ulterior advantage is indeed the great 
flexibility at disposal of competent authorities, which, depending on the characteristics of their 
financial systems and on the data availability and quality, may decide to implement different 
methods to recover the desired information. Nevertheless, the accuracy of a specific approach, 
such as for the determination of the probabilities of default, depends on the theoretical 
assumptions, since they might not hold in reality.  
However, the Goodhart and Segoviano’s original effort to address the lack of an optimal 
recovery threshold has one main limitation. As regards their sample of banks, on the one hand, 
they employed data of top European banks to judge the behaviour of solvent banks. On the 
other hand, with respect to the insolvent ones, they used both European and a US data. As I 
already mentioned, the issue of European studies is the lack of data for insolvent core banks. 
To avoid this problem, they complemented their dataset with some US banks, specifically 
Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual, which are two investment banks. Indeed, including 
in the sample both commercial and investment banks, which have different balance sheet 
structures, may lead to unreliable results. In addition, in the period that those banks defaulted, 
their reported probabilities of default, of approximately 34% and 21% respectively, are much 
bigger than the probabilities of default of the two European failed banks (13%). Therefore, the 
shape of the cumulative distribution, which I discussed earlier, is affected in a substantial way. 
As a result of these considerations, I tried to develop a model for the Italian banking system, 
which, ideally, can be used by competent authorities to better balance the quantitative 
intervention threshold. To do so, I took into account the Italian banks that are listed in the Milan 
stock exchange, excluding the institutions that conduct mainly investment banking activity3. In 
this way, the model allowed me to evaluate and compare both the past and the current conditions 
of Italian banks, with respect to their probability of default and their ability to absorb the 
potential extreme losses that may occur. In addition, after aggregating the results for the banks 
that remained solvent, it is possible to provide the estimates of Type II error. On the contrary, 
as regards the insolvent banks and thus the Type I error, the results were not as reliable as the 
solvent ones. I used data of two listed banks, Banca Etruria and Banca Popolare the Spoleto, 
that were put under extraordinary administration by the Italian Ministry of Economy and 
                                                          
3 Mediobanca, Banca Finnat, FinecoBank and Banca Profilo were excluded from the sample. 
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Finance. However, probably due to the small amount of observations of insolvent banks and 
the relative small importance of those in the sample, the final results cannot be considered 
satisfactory. Following the idea of Betz et al. (2013), a possible solution, which I tried to 
implement, could be that of consider also the state interventions and mergers in distress, in 
addition to bankruptcies, liquidations and defaults. 
3.3.1. Criterion for intervention  
The stages of the model implementation are well summarised by Figure 12.  
First, in order to choose a threshold, we need to define the criterion for intervention. This will 
be the critical ratio, through which the institutions that should be subjected to intervention can 
be identified, whether with recovery or milder sanctions. The easiest solution is to follow the 
concept that is at the basis of the regulatory framework of the Basel Accord, but adopting some 
modifications to overcome its problems. In particular, Basel’s rules emphasise that expected 
losses (EL) should be managed through the pricing of credit exposures and through 
provisioning, since they are viewed as normal a cost component of doing business. On the other 
side, capital should serve to cover the institution from unexpected losses (UL), up to a certain 
degree of confidence. Therefore, in order to judge the health of an institution, one should 
analyse the ability of the institution to absorb both expected and unexpected losses. For these 
reasons, the loss absorption buffer can be defined as the sum of capital and provisions, while 
the sum of expected and unexpected losses represents the potential extreme losses. As a result, 
the early intervention measures should be triggered only when the potential extreme losses are 
larger than the loss absorption buffer of the bank: 
𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡 > 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑡    (1). 
Figure 12: Model implementation steps 
Source: Goodhart and Segoviano (2015) 
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Hence, in order to develop this criterion, it is crucial to: 
a. define the components of the loss absorption buffer; and  
b. specify of an approach to estimate the loss distribution, through which calculate the 
potential extreme losses. 
a. Loss absorption buffer  
As regards the first goal, the traditional techniques to assess the level of absorption buffer use 
the accounting value of regulatory capital expressed in relation to a measure of its risk-weighted 
assets (RWA). However, these quantities, that are commonly called Capital Adequacy Ratios 
(CARs), are not reliable in the framework of early intervention. Many researchers sustain that 
these measures lack in reliability due to the difficulties in assessing the true value of both the 
numerator and the denominator. In particular, “despite progress in requiring banks to employ 
asset valuations that track the economic value of tangible assets better, book equity remains a 
highly deficient means of measuring the true economic value of equity” (Calomiris, 2015, p. 4). 
There are essentially two motivations to avoid the use of accounting measures. First, when 
institutions experience losses on their tangible assets, such as loans, they typically postpone the 
recognition of the problems. In addition, this delayed recognition is often permitted, since it is 
convenient to supervisors and to banks, in order to continue the normal operations. Second and 
more important, when a bank becomes financially stressed, it is extremely probable that the real 
value of its equity is already severely impaired before the recognition in the accounting and 
regulatory values. On the other hand, also the value of denominator presents some problems. 
Specifically, the measure of the risk-weighted assets might have different regulatory definitions 
across countries and might be subject to the accounting manipulation problem. 
Therefore, an adjustment of the parameters can help to get rid of these issues. In particular, 
since the book value of equity does not mirror the market perceptions, a correct way to ensure 
the adequacy of equity capital might be considering the economic value of capital itself. For 
listed banks such a value is the Market Capitalization. It could represent the right measure not 
only because it is more accurate and reacts faster to changes, but also because it captures the 
opinions of the market place, which are important for the sustainability of the institution. 
However, since it can still be subject to both market over-shoots and temporary crashes, a 
quarterly moving average of Market Capitalization was implemented. Beside the value of 
capital, the provisions were also included as part of the numerator of the loss absorption buffer, 
since they are needed to protect against expected losses. Differently from the market 
capitalization, these quantities are not subject to market over-shoots and they are usually kept 
in cash or in low-risk liquid fixed income assets. Moreover, given its simplicity of calculation, 
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Total Assets (TA) is used as denominator of the buffer. The idea of combination Capital 
Adequacy Ratios with Leverage Ratios should provide an efficient way to avoid the difficulties 
in assessing RWAs and allow an easier comparison across institutions. As a result of these 
considerations, the risk sensitive loss absorption buffer ratio can be defined as: 
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑡 = 
𝑀𝐴4(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑡)+𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡
    (2), 
where 
𝑀𝐴4(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑡) =  
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑡+𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑡−1+𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑡−2+𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑡−3
4
   (3). 
This becomes the target ratio that will be compared with the potential extreme losses, in order 
to understand which institutions should be subject to intervention. This buffer is able to reflect 
more closely market perceptions and, at the same time, it is less subject to accounting 
manipulation or regulatory divergences. In addition, being a more transparent indicator, it is 
easier estimable by regulators, investors, and markets. 
b. Potential extreme losses 
The loss absorption buffer must be compared with the potential extreme losses, defined as the 
sum of Expected and Unexpected losses. In order to measure them, we need the loss 
distributions of the banks at each period of time. Thus, from the distribution it is possible to 
retrieve the information about the amount of losses that a bank can potentially experience and 
their respective probability of occurrence. For example, Figure 13 illustrates how the variation 
over time of the loss rates lead to the distribution of losses. As reasonable, Expected Losses 
(EL) can be identified by focusing on the mean value of this distribution. On the contrary, by 
looking on the high percentiles of the loss distribution, it is possible to infer the value of the 
Unexpected Losses (UL).  
Basel Committee (2015) 
Figure 13: Loss Rates and Loss Distribution   
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There are essentially two techniques to evaluate a loss distribution function. The ﬁrst is based 
on Monte Carlo simulation, where losses are simulated and organised in form of a histogram in 
order to obtain an empirical loss distribution of the underlying portfolio. The second is based 
on a so-called analytical approximation. Briefly, this approach associates the actual portfolio 
with an unknown loss distribution to an equivalent portfolio with known loss distribution. In 
this study, the loss distribution function has been estimated under the Vasicek approach, which 
belongs to the second category just described. This method is used by the Basel regulatory 
framework to recover explicitly the default rate of a portfolio of loans, to evaluate the portfolios’ 
loss distributions and, at the end, to quantify the capital requirements for that portfolio. 
Goodhart and Segoviano (2015) applied this approach to the banks by calculating the 
probabilities of default and using them as input in the Vasicek’s model, which requires an 
average unconditional probability of default. This approach is highly useful given its theoretical 
simplicity, but is based on some key assumptions which may fail to hold in the reality. Vasicek 
(2002) assumed that the number of obligors in a portfolio tends to infinity and that they are 
homogeneous. Another limitation applying its model is the fact that we cannot measure the 
portion of systemic risk, which is the contagion that a distressed bank can produce on the other 
banks of the system. To take into consideration the potential losses suffered owing to the banks’ 
interconnections, Goodhart and Segoviano (2015) implemented the Threshold-approach, which 
is a non parametric model. Therefore, it is based on fewer assumptions and might be preferred 
in certain circumstances. At the same time however, the Threshold-approach is based on a more 
complex theoretical framework and requires an elaborate estimation. As shown by the authors, 
the Threshold-approach produces, unsurprisingly, lower Type I and Type II errors than under 
the Vasicek approach. Nevertheless, the final results are very similar.  
- Probability of Default  
In order to determine the probabilities of default for each bank, many different approaches can 
be used. The most common way consists in the extraction of these probabilities from the well-
known Merton’s model. Given the sample of banks under analysis and their data availability, I 
chose to implement this approach. In brief, Merton assumes that the total value of a firm’s assets 
(𝐴𝑡) follows a geometric Brownian motion, with a mean rate of return (𝜇𝐴) and volatility (𝜎𝐴). 
The debt instead is assumed to be a single outstanding bond with face value (𝐹) and maturity 
(𝑇). The firm defaults at the bond maturity when the value of its assets falls below the amount 
of debt it has to repay, otherwise it pays its debt in full. Therefore, in Merton’s view, the equity 
(𝐸) is a call option on the firm’s assets. As a result, the probability of default at time T, measured 
at time t, is given by:  
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  𝑃𝑡[𝐴𝑇 ≤ 𝐹] = 𝑁[−𝑑2]        (4), 
 where  
𝑑2 =  
ln(
𝐴𝑡
𝐹
)+0.5∗(𝜇𝐴−𝜎𝐴
2)(𝑇−𝑡)
𝜎𝐴√𝑇−𝑡
      (5). 
To overcome the assumptions made by Merton, the literature provides several specifications of 
this model. In particular, some of the specifications made by Kealhofer, Merton and Vasicek 
(KMV), such as the choice of the face value of the firm’s debt, have been adopted in this study. 
In order to implement the model, the first information required are the economic value of equity 
and the volatility of the equity returns (𝜎𝐸). Therefore, the market capitalization is used as equity 
value, while to obtain the volatility, the historical values of stock prices were analysed. Hence, 
I calculated the historical logarithmic returns of stock prices and, from them, I retrieved the 
annualised standard deviation4.  In particular, three different time windows of 180 days, 270 
days and 360 days have been used to calculate the volatility. Moreover, as regards the values 
of the expected return on assets (𝜇𝐴), I followed the basic formulation of the Merton’s model. 
Thus, I replaced the assets expected return with the risk-free rate (𝑟). In this way, the probability 
measure that governs the asset and default processes represents risk-neutral probabilities of 
default. They are only valid in a risk-neutral world in which 𝜇𝐴 = 𝑟, but in the real world 
investors demand 𝜇𝐴 > 𝑟. As a result, this leads to an overestimation of the probabilities of 
default. I compared the results of using the yield of the 1-year BOT and the 10-years benchmark 
BTP, since they incorporate the risk of the country. In any case, probabilities of default are not 
sensitive to calibration of different expect returns, since the final results are find to change very 
slightly. In alternative, the assets expected return could have been estimated separately, by 
applying the CAPM model5, but again the outcome on the probabilities of default would have 
not been significantly different.  
For the next step, as it is common to assume, I set the forecasting horizon of one year (𝑇 = 1). 
According to this time window, the amount of debt that should be considered for the potential 
default is the portion of total liabilities that is due in one year. Therefore, the total debt is 
inadequate since not all of it is due in one year. However, also the short term debt maturing in 
one year is not suitable since, in case of default, the bank might be forced to serve senior 
                                                          
4 𝜎𝐸𝑎 = 𝜎𝐸𝑑√252 
5 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑀: 𝜇𝐴 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝐴 ∗  𝑀𝑃 where 𝛽𝐴 = 𝛽𝐸 ∗
𝜎𝐴
𝜎𝐸
 and 𝑀𝑃 is the market premium. 
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liabilities with longer maturity first. Hence, as suggested by the KMV specification, the face 
value of the debt to be considered is the short-term liabilities plus half of the long-term 
liabilities. Like for the equity volatility, the sensitivity of results with respect to different 
definitions of the default barrier has been checked.  
At this point, the remaining input variables are the market value of assets (𝐴0) and the volatility 
of assets returns (𝜎𝐴). Unfortunately, they are both usually directly unobservable. However, in 
accordance with the KMV specification, it is possible to use prices of traded securities issued 
by the firm to identify these quantities implicitly. In fact, such values can be recovered by 
solving simultaneously the following system of equations: 
{
  𝐸0 = 𝐴0 𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝐹𝑒
−𝑟𝑇 𝑁(𝑑2)
 
𝜎𝐸 =
𝐴0
𝐸0
 𝑁(𝑑1) 𝜎𝐴                   
                                           (6). 
The first function represents the present value of the firm equity, which can be defined through 
the Black-Scholes specification. In fact, the Equity holders receive what remains after having 
paid the debtholders on date 𝑇. The second equation, which is obtained by applying the Ito’s 
lemma, determines the relation between the volatility of equity returns and the volatility of 
assets returns. Therefore, using MATLAB6, it is possible to simultaneously solve the system of 
equations (6). However, since there are infinite pair of values of 𝐴 and 𝜎𝐴, they were computed 
by minimizing the following function: 
𝜀 = (
𝑂𝑏𝑠 𝐸𝑡−𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐸𝑡
𝑂𝑏𝑠 𝐸𝑡
)
2
+ (
𝑂𝑏𝑠 𝜎𝐸−𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝜎𝐸
𝑂𝑏𝑠 𝜎𝐸
)
2
      (7). 
This function sums the squared errors between the observed values (𝑂𝑏𝑠 𝐸𝑡 and 𝑂𝑏𝑠 𝜎𝐸) and 
the new obtained values (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐸𝑡 and 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝜎𝐸). To start the iterations, the two initial 
estimates of the unknowns were set as: 
 𝐴0 = 𝐸0 + 𝐹0            (8), 
and            
𝜎𝐴 = 𝐸0 ∗
𝜎𝐸
𝐴0
           (9).  
 
                                                          
6 MATLAB script is presented in Annex A 
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- Quantification of Losses   
Once probabilities of default for each bank have been identified, it is possible to implement 
several methodologies to determine banks’ loss distribution and, consequently, quantify their 
potential losses. These approaches differ significantly in their theoretical foundation, 
assumptions and data requirements. As already mentioned, I quantify the losses under the 
Vasicek approach, which is the method employed by the Basel regulatory framework. 
Given the fact that in Merton’s model the probability of default and the default threshold are 
linked through the normal distribution function, Vasicek (2002) showed that by applying the 
inverse normal distribution function to the unconditional probabilities of default ( 𝑁−1(𝑃𝐷)), 
it is possible to derive the appropriate default threshold for “average” conditions. Similarly, in 
the Vasicek’s formula the required conservative value of the systematic risk factor is also taken 
into consideration by using the inverse of the normal distribution function of the regulatory 
confidence level 𝑥 ( 𝑁−1(𝑥)). In particular, under the Basel II framework losses are computed 
at the 99.9th percentile. The sum of the default threshold and the conservative value of the 
systematic factor yields to the “conditional default threshold”. The new threshold is then used 
as input into the original Merton model by applying the normal distribution function, which 
returns a conditional probability of default. All the steps performed are summarised in the 
following equation:   
𝐹(𝑥; 𝑃𝐷, 𝜌) = 𝑁 (√
1−𝜌
𝜌
  𝑁−1(𝑥) −  √
1
𝜌
 𝑁−1(𝑃𝐷))               (10), 
where 𝑥 is the regulatory confidence level, 𝑃𝐷 is the unconditional probability of default and 𝜌 
is the asset correlation. This last term can be described as the dependence of the asset value of 
a borrower on the general state of the economy. Hence, the two elements of equation (10) must 
be weighted with respect to the asset correlation, since all borrowers are linked to each other 
by the single risk factor. The asset correlation was estimated following the instructions of the 
regulatory framework. For corporate, bank and sovereign exposures, the supervisory the asset 
correlation function, which was derived by G10 supervisors, is built of two limit correlations 
of 12% and 24%. Between these limits, correlations are modelled by an exponential weighting 
function that displays the dependency on PD: 
𝜌 = 0.12 ∗
(1−𝑒−50∗𝑃𝐷)
1−𝑒−50
+ 0.24 ∗
(1−𝑒−50∗𝑃𝐷)
1−𝑒−50
                 (11). 
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The values the EL and UL (Figure 14), expressed as percentage of assets, were obtained by 
multiplying the conditional probability of default, calculated at the 99.9% percentile of loss 
distribution, with the Losses Given Default rate (LGD). As suggested by Goodhart and 
Segoviano (2015), a LGD of 45% has been adopted by credit risk modellers as a reasonable 
assumption for loss estimation in the absence of data to estimate LGDs.  
Hence, employing the following equation it is possible to calculate the sum of expected and 
unexpected losses:  
𝐸𝐿 + 𝑈𝐿 = 𝑁 (√
1−𝜌
𝜌
  𝑁−1(𝑥) −  √
1
𝜌
 𝑁−1(𝑃𝐷)) ∗ 𝐿𝐺𝐷 ∗  𝑀𝐴             (12),  
where 𝑀𝐴 is the Maturity Adjustment coefficient, defined as: 
𝑀𝐴 = 
1+(𝑀−2.5)∗𝑏(𝑃𝐷)
1−1.5∗𝑏(𝑃𝐷)
                  (13),  
where,   
𝑏(𝑃𝐷) = [(0.11852 − 0.05478 ∗ 𝐿𝑁(𝑃𝐷)]2              (14), 
and M is the maturity of the instrument. In fact, since credit portfolios consist of instruments 
that have different maturities, the regulatory framework wants that the longer the maturity the 
higher the capital requirements. Nevertheless, in my case M is equal to 1 year and consequently 
equation (13) results in a maturity adjustment coefficient of 100%.   
Figure 14: Loss Distribution   
Source: Basel Committee (2005) 
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3.4. Data 
 Sample of Banks   
- Solvent banks: UniCredit, Intesa Sanpaolo, Unione di Banche Italiane, Banco Popolare, 
Banca Popolare dell'Emilia Romagna, Banca Popolare di Milano, Banca Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena, Credito Emiliano, Banca Popolare di Sondrio, Credito Valtellinese, 
Banca Carige, Banco Desio Brianza, Banco di Sardegna. 
- Insolvent banks: Banca Popolare dell'Etruria e del Lazio, Banca Popolare di Spoleto. 
 
 Input Variables   
- Daily Frequency: stock prices. 
- Monthly Frequency: 1y BOT, benchmark 10y BTP. 
- Quarterly Frequency: total assets, total liabilities, number of total common shares 
outstanding. 
 
 Estimated Variables 
- Daily Frequency: stock returns, returns volatilities. 
- Quarterly Frequency: market capitalisation, short-term liabilities, long-term liabilities, 
provisions, asset value, asset volatilities. 
 
 Summary of data statistics 
I obtained or estimated the previous variables from 31 December 2005 to 30 June 2016, for a 
total of 2664 daily observations for each the 15 banks analysed. The relevant statistics are 
summarised in the tables presented for convenience in Annex B. As regards the inputs variables, 
all the balance sheets information and stock prices were retrieved from the Thomson Reuters 
Eikon Database. The risk free rates were instead acquired from the statistical database (Infostat) 
provided by the Bank of Italy. Switching to the estimated variables, I used the end of the quarter 
number of total common shares outstanding and the corresponding daily stock price (Table 1), 
to evaluate the market capitalization of each bank in each period (Table 2). With respect to 
these variables, it is important to observe that, for the majority of banks, the last observations 
of stock prices are close to the lowest historical values. This is also true if we look at the market 
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capitalisation. In addition, the market capitalization shows that the Italian banking system is 
driven by two major banking groups, UniCredit and Intesa Sanpaolo.  
Similarly, the same characteristic can be recognised if we look at the Total Assets (Table 3) and 
Provisions (Table 4). The value of total assets was recovered using the corresponding balance 
sheet’s item from the Eikon database. Provisions were obtained from the same database, but 
examining, in addition, the original format of the balance sheets and considering the appropriate 
items for each bank, such as the Provisions for risks and charges, Provision for employee 
severance pay, Risks/Charges Allowances, Loan Loss Allowances and Other Provisions. 
Therefore, data on market capitalisation, provisions and total assets were implemented to 
estimate the Loss Absorption Buffers as in equation (2), whose results are presented in the 
following chapter.  
On the other hand, in order to apply the Merton model and evaluate the Potential Extreme 
Losses, I estimated the following variables. Beside the information on market capitalization, I 
obtained the values of Short Term Liabilities (Table 5) and Long Term Liabilities (Table 6), 
whose sum, in the modality I already described, was used as default barrier. In order to 
discriminate between the two quantitates, I managed both the standardized and the original 
formats of the balance sheets provided by the Eikon database. In general, the items Total 
Deposits, Other Bearing Liabilities, Total Short Term Borrowings and Other Current liabilities 
were considered Short Term Liabilities, while Total Debt, Deferred Income Tax and Other 
Liabilities were marked as Long Term Liabilities. In addition, in case of any missing data, I 
performed both the average between the closest available observations or, in some cases, I 
added the missing values by searching them in the institutional websites. 
Moreover, using daily stock prices I computed the daily logarithmic returns and their annualised 
volatilities. With respect to the equity volatility, I compared the consequences of using three 
different time windows (Table 7). As expected, the larger the window considered the smoother 
the volatilities values. In fact, from Figure 15, which shows the evolution over time of the 
volatility, we can observe that a small window has more extreme values. In any case, it is clear 
that peaks of volatilities are reached during the crisis periods. Nevertheless, it is also important 
to notice that, for many banks, the stock return volatilities assume high values in recent times, 
specifically in the last period. In fact, the last observations, which for solvent banks correspond 
to the 30th June 2016, are influenced by the extremely negative returns reached the 24th June 
after the publication of the results of the British referendum about the permanence in the 
European Union. That day, the announcement of the so-called Brexit caused a loss of 12,48 
percentage points in the FTSE Mib index. In particular, the shares of the banking sector lost 
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more than 20%. As a result, I expect that the probabilities of default of the last period will be 
dramatically influenced by both the high volatility values and low stock prices. For these 
reasons, the results that I will present are based on the equity volatility computed with the 360 
days window. In conclusion, following the procedure described earlier, I reported the estimated 
values of Assets (Table 8), together with the estimated Volatilities of assets returns (Table 9), 
that were obtained through the minimisation of equation (7). The values of this equation are 
reported in Table 10.  
  
Figure 15: Volatilities Evolution  
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3.5. Results 
With the described dataset and the estimated parameters, I quantified the loss absorption buffers 
and the potential extreme losses for each bank in each period of time: these are the components 
of the intervention criterion. The first step involved the calculation of the daily probabilities of 
default. Table 11 illustrates the evolution of the one-year probabilities of default, obtained at 
the end of each quarter through the application of the Merton’s model to all the banks under 
analysis.  
 
Table 11: Estimated One-Year Probabilities of Default  
PD UCG ISP UBI BP BPER BPM BMPS CE BPSO CVAL CRG BDB BSRP PEL SPO
Jun-16 3,28% 1,56% 3,92% 9,27% 5,17% 4,26% 15,78% 0,27% 0,41% 2,36% 8,59% 0,38% 0,01%
Mar-16 1,07% 0,43% 1,72% 3,41% 2,45% 1,69% 15,37% 0,09% 0,27% 1,71% 8,05% 0,13% 0,00%
Dec-15 0,21% 0,11% 0,47% 0,70% 1,09% 0,66% 6,06% 0,02% 0,11% 0,81% 1,75% 0,01% 0,00%
Sep-15 0,26% 0,17% 0,77% 1,05% 1,61% 1,05% 14,27% 0,03% 0,20% 1,13% 2,45% 0,01% 0,00%
Jun-15 0,19% 0,10% 0,79% 1,88% 1,80% 1,33% 13,94% 0,04% 0,19% 1,47% 3,46% 0,03% 0,00%
Mar-15 0,16% 0,08% 0,62% 2,20% 1,65% 1,48% 12,54% 0,04% 0,14% 1,33% 2,82% 0,03% 0,00% 6,23%
Dec-14 0,16% 0,10% 0,71% 2,19% 1,79% 1,32% 10,77% 0,06% 0,07% 0,99% 2,74% 0,02% 0,00% 2,65%
Sep-14 0,08% 0,07% 0,59% 1,94% 1,58% 1,40% 7,76% 0,03% 0,05% 0,56% 1,38% 0,03% 0,00% 2,80%
Jun-14 0,19% 0,11% 0,62% 2,11% 1,56% 1,61% 8,33% 0,05% 0,12% 0,36% 1,76% 0,02% 0,00% 4,26%
Mar-14 0,20% 0,10% 0,48% 1,92% 1,25% 1,35% 2,32% 0,04% 0,05% 0,23% 0,76% 0,01% 0,00% 0,82%
Dec-13 0,43% 0,38% 0,84% 1,29% 1,92% 1,54% 3,60% 0,06% 0,16% 0,13% 0,70% 0,01% 0,00% 1,75%
Sep-13 1,34% 0,94% 1,60% 2,27% 3,47% 2,47% 4,61% 0,29% 0,37% 0,67% 1,04% 0,14% 0,00% 1,23% 4,40%
Jun-13 2,18% 1,37% 2,02% 3,68% 4,00% 4,58% 6,71% 0,77% 0,49% 1,51% 1,31% 0,18% 0,00% 1,02% 3,82%
Mar-13 6,81% 3,09% 3,24% 5,36% 5,54% 7,86% 9,48% 1,50% 0,51% 1,57% 1,64% 0,21% 0,64% 0,37% 5,41%
Dec-12 10,61% 6,38% 4,36% 6,48% 5,88% 9,91% 9,02% 2,61% 0,75% 1,69% 2,17% 0,25% 0,80% 0,74% 0,54%
Sep-12 12,05% 7,88% 5,24% 7,14% 5,97% 11,44% 9,70% 3,29% 0,97% 1,85% 2,62% 0,19% 0,95% 1,15% 0,56%
Jun-12 10,77% 6,69% 3,98% 6,21% 3,90% 10,47% 7,01% 2,83% 0,48% 1,51% 1,74% 0,07% 0,99% 2,71% 0,23%
Mar-12 8,53% 5,30% 2,87% 4,12% 1,99% 7,84% 4,94% 1,93% 0,23% 0,34% 0,89% 0,00% 0,87% 2,46% 1,07%
Dec-11 4,51% 4,65% 2,05% 2,13% 1,29% 4,59% 1,65% 1,14% 0,12% 0,11% 0,41% 0,00% 0,65% 1,87% 0,88%
Sep-11 2,67% 3,20% 1,09% 1,37% 0,67% 2,79% 0,71% 1,03% 0,15% 0,08% 0,28% 0,00% 0,01% 0,19% 0,48%
Jun-11 0,70% 0,81% 0,18% 0,39% 0,14% 0,70% 0,12% 0,17% 0,02% 0,01% 0,03% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
Mar-11 0,66% 0,57% 0,12% 0,40% 0,11% 0,34% 0,04% 0,23% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
Dec-10 0,64% 0,43% 0,04% 0,41% 0,09% 0,45% 0,03% 0,35% 0,01% 0,00% 0,01% 0,00% 0,00% 0,02% 0,02%
Sep-10 1,06% 0,58% 0,13% 0,97% 0,12% 0,70% 0,05% 0,51% 0,01% 0,00% 0,01% 0,00% 0,00% 0,02% 0,02%
Jun-10 4,74% 2,32% 0,89% 4,83% 0,42% 1,13% 0,18% 1,67% 0,01% 0,03% 0,04% 0,00% 0,01% 0,03% 0,00%
Mar-10 7,64% 3,88% 0,95% 6,80% 0,19% 0,75% 0,14% 1,64% 0,00% 0,08% 0,19% 0,00% 0,03% 0,00% 0,00%
Dec-09 12,54% 6,51% 1,79% 9,54% 0,40% 2,60% 0,36% 2,27% 0,03% 0,22% 1,14% 0,03% 0,12% 0,21% 0,00%
Sep-09 12,50% 6,71% 1,77% 9,46% 0,40% 2,57% 0,49% 1,90% 0,01% 0,18% 1,26% 0,04% 0,17% 1,13% 0,10%
Jun-09 12,67% 6,61% 1,75% 9,77% 0,37% 2,44% 0,63% 1,79% 0,01% 0,22% 1,52% 0,09% 0,16% 1,67% 0,71%
Mar-09 11,59% 5,71% 0,94% 7,70% 0,20% 1,90% 0,53% 1,36% 0,03% 0,19% 1,46% 0,14% 0,11% 0,94% 0,82%
Dec-08 5,78% 2,42% 0,16% 2,80% 0,03% 1,23% 0,15% 0,23% 0,01% 0,03% 1,22% 0,05% 0,02% 0,32% 0,60%
Sep-08 0,32% 0,01% 0,00% 0,29% 0,00% 0,17% 0,02% 0,04% 0,00% 0,00% 0,11% 0,02% 0,00% 0,05% 0,10%
Jun-08 0,05% 0,00% 0,00% 0,11% 0,00% 0,04% 0,00% 0,01% 0,00% 0,00% 0,01% 0,01% 0,00% 0,05% 0,13%
Mar-08 0,01% 0,00% 0,00% 0,03% 0,00% 0,01% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,01% 0,00% 0,01% 0,02%
Dec-07 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
Sep-07 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
Jun-07 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
Mar-07 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
Dec-06 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
Sep-06 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,01%
Jun-06 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,03%
Mar-06 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,11%
Dec-05 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,03%
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First of all, according to my expectations, the last period of observations is characterized by 
rising probabilities of default for all the banks in the sample. In particular, the highest 
probability of default of 15,78% belongs to Banca Monte Paschi di Siena, whose difficulties 
are quite evident. From around 2012, this institution exhibits probabilities of default that are 
almost always higher than 5%. These extreme values could be explained by the repeated drops 
of the stock price, which were due to many different reasons. For example, at the end of 2011, 
MPS recorded a loss of 4,69€ billion and was obliged to recapitalize and to face restructuring. 
Moreover, on 23rd January 2013, the scandal of the hidden derivatives, used to avoid the 
disclosure of losses from the bank's financial statements, was revealed, and finally, in October 
2014, the bank failed the ECB's stress test, as well as the most recent one in July 2016. Together 
with Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Banca Carige was the other Italian bank that had to raise capital 
after failing the ECB stress tests in 2014. From December 2015, we can see from the table that 
the probability of default raised over 8%. Similarly to Monte Paschi, Carige experienced a huge 
price drop of its stock price, which reached, on 7th July 2016, the new lowest historical level at 
0,2854. Moreover, from the beginning of 2016, the ECB asked Carige, and also Monte Paschi, 
to provide on a daily basis their liquidity levels. A duty that, after the 2014 stress test, was due 
on a weekly basis.  
On the contrary, Banca Popolare di Sondrio, Banco Desio e Brianza and Banco di Sardegna 
never experienced probabilities of default over 1%. Unione Banche Italiane, Banca Popolare 
dell’Emilia Romagna, Credito Emiliano and Credito Valtellinese had also low probabilities of 
default for all the period under analysis. Instead, by looking at the values of Unicredit and Intesa 
Sanpaolo, the two leading Italian banks, it is possible to notice how the probabilities of default 
increased in the period following the Global Financial crisis and the European Sovereign Debt 
Crisis. The same pattern can be observed in the values of Banco Popolare and Banca Popolare 
di Milano, two banks that on 24th March 2016 announced their merge. Finally, as regards the 
two insolvent banks we can see a dramatic jump in the probabilities of default. On the one hand, 
Spoleto, as at 31st December 2012, had a Tier 1 capital ratio of 6.45% and from February 2013 
it was put under extraordinary administration by the Ministry of Economy and Finance; a period 
that ended the 31st July 2014, after which the institution joined Banco Desio. On the other hand, 
Banca Etruria was one of the first banks, whose rescue was treated in accordance with the Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive. The 30th June 2014, the Tier 1 capital ratio fell to just 6.1% 
and in early 2015 the bank was administrated by the Ministry of Economy and Finance.  
Similar conclusions can be drawn if we look at the transformation of probabilities of default in 
distances to default (Table 12). Nevertheless, by focusing on this variable, we can evaluate 
69 
 
which institutions felt under the threshold of 1,5 established by Goodhart and Segoviano (2015). 
Again, Monte Paschi crosses many times the threshold level, together with the last two quarters 
of Banca Carige. Unicredit, Intesa San Paolo, Banco Popolare and Banca Popolare di Milano 
showed low levels of DD during the crisis periods. In addition, only Banco Popolare felt under 
the threshold level also in the last quarter. The other banks would have never triggered 
intervention with the specified threshold level. Again for insolvent banks the results appear to 
be unconvincing. However, better conclusions can be achieved if we look at the difference 
between Extreme losses and the loss absorption capital (Table 13).  
Table 12: Distances to Default 
DD UCG ISP UBI BP BPER BPM MPS CE BPSO CVAL CRG BDB BSRP PEL SPO
Jun-16 1,84 2,15 1,76 1,32 1,63 1,72 1,00 2,78 2,64 1,98 1,37 2,67 3,62
Mar-16 2,30 2,63 2,11 1,82 1,97 2,12 1,02 3,11 2,78 2,12 1,40 3,00 4,53
Dec-15 2,86 3,07 2,60 2,46 2,29 2,48 1,55 3,50 3,07 2,41 2,11 3,82 5,34
Sep-15 2,80 2,92 2,42 2,31 2,14 2,31 1,07 3,39 2,87 2,28 1,97 3,77 6,01
Jun-15 2,89 3,10 2,41 2,08 2,10 2,22 1,08 3,34 2,89 2,18 1,82 3,40 5,56
Mar-15 2,95 3,15 2,50 2,01 2,13 2,18 1,15 3,35 2,98 2,22 1,91 3,40 5,32 1,54
Dec-14 2,95 3,09 2,45 2,02 2,10 2,22 1,24 3,26 3,20 2,33 1,92 3,48 5,02 1,93
Sep-14 3,14 3,21 2,52 2,07 2,15 2,20 1,42 3,41 3,31 2,54 2,20 3,47 5,17 1,91
Jun-14 2,89 3,05 2,50 2,03 2,16 2,14 1,38 3,29 3,03 2,69 2,11 3,49 4,95 1,72
Mar-14 2,88 3,11 2,59 2,07 2,24 2,21 1,99 3,35 3,28 2,83 2,43 3,65 5,29 2,40
Dec-13 2,63 2,67 2,39 2,23 2,07 2,16 1,80 3,24 2,94 3,01 2,46 3,83 5,18 2,11
Sep-13 2,22 2,35 2,15 2,00 1,82 1,97 1,68 2,76 2,67 2,47 2,31 2,99 5,23 2,25 1,71
Jun-13 2,02 2,21 2,05 1,79 1,75 1,69 1,50 2,42 2,58 2,17 2,22 2,91 4,90 2,32 1,77
Mar-13 1,49 1,87 1,85 1,61 1,59 1,41 1,31 2,17 2,57 2,15 2,13 2,87 2,49 2,68 1,61
Dec-12 1,25 1,52 1,71 1,52 1,56 1,29 1,34 1,94 2,43 2,12 2,02 2,80 2,41 2,44 2,55
Sep-12 1,17 1,41 1,62 1,47 1,56 1,20 1,30 1,84 2,34 2,09 1,94 2,90 2,34 2,27 2,54
Jun-12 1,24 1,50 1,75 1,54 1,76 1,26 1,48 1,91 2,59 2,17 2,11 3,18 2,33 1,92 2,83
Mar-12 1,37 1,62 1,90 1,74 2,06 1,42 1,65 2,07 2,84 2,71 2,37 3,93 2,38 1,97 2,30
Dec-11 1,69 1,68 2,04 2,03 2,23 1,69 2,13 2,28 3,03 3,07 2,64 4,14 2,49 2,08 2,37
Sep-11 1,93 1,85 2,30 2,21 2,47 1,91 2,45 2,32 2,98 3,17 2,77 4,30 3,83 2,89 2,59
Jun-11 2,46 2,41 2,91 2,66 3,00 2,46 3,04 2,92 3,61 3,72 3,42 4,90 4,51 4,45 4,50
Mar-11 2,48 2,53 3,03 2,65 3,07 2,70 3,33 2,83 3,66 3,65 3,74 4,76 4,58 4,85 4,93
Dec-10 2,49 2,63 3,33 2,64 3,13 2,61 3,46 2,70 3,63 3,95 3,85 5,00 4,53 3,59 3,60
Sep-10 2,31 2,53 3,02 2,34 3,02 2,46 3,32 2,57 3,74 4,06 3,76 4,86 4,09 3,54 3,52
Jun-10 1,67 1,99 2,37 1,66 2,64 2,28 2,92 2,13 3,63 3,43 3,34 4,04 3,64 3,45 3,90
Mar-10 1,43 1,77 2,35 1,49 2,89 2,43 3,00 2,13 4,19 3,16 2,89 4,06 3,44 4,21 4,82
Dec-09 1,15 1,51 2,10 1,31 2,65 1,94 2,69 2,00 3,42 2,85 2,28 3,46 3,03 2,86 4,36
Sep-09 1,15 1,50 2,10 1,31 2,65 1,95 2,58 2,07 3,65 2,91 2,24 3,35 2,93 2,28 3,10
Jun-09 1,14 1,51 2,11 1,29 2,68 1,97 2,50 2,10 3,67 2,85 2,16 3,12 2,94 2,13 2,45
Mar-09 1,20 1,58 2,35 1,43 2,88 2,08 2,55 2,21 3,39 2,89 2,18 2,99 3,07 2,35 2,40
Dec-08 1,57 1,97 2,95 1,91 3,48 2,25 2,96 2,84 3,66 3,41 2,25 3,30 3,53 2,73 2,51
Sep-08 2,73 3,63 4,22 2,76 4,26 2,93 3,57 3,36 5,09 4,55 3,07 3,49 4,84 3,31 3,09
Jun-08 3,27 4,49 4,87 3,07 5,04 3,36 4,19 3,80 5,31 5,13 3,78 3,70 5,20 3,28 3,02
Mar-08 3,62 4,92 5,17 3,46 5,34 3,76 5,09 4,27 5,49 4,85 3,99 3,82 5,76 3,67 3,52
Dec-07 4,63 5,56 6,17 4,11 5,97 3,97 6,20 4,79 6,08 5,42 5,12 4,18 6,63 4,10 4,29
Sep-07 4,79 5,32 6,05 4,29 6,09 4,09 6,66 4,28 9,32 5,46 5,03 4,19 7,33 5,28 5,66
Jun-07 5,25 5,12 6,18 5,22 6,72 4,04 6,50 4,34 9,47 5,47 5,31 4,22 7,94 6,51 6,58
Mar-07 5,21 5,23 6,23 5,20 7,54 4,19 6,14 4,40 11,18 5,75 5,68 4,49 8,66 6,43 5,77
Dec-06 5,36 5,44 6,22 5,49 8,90 4,24 6,12 4,38 11,58 5,73 5,93 4,51 9,04 4,86 4,54
Sep-06 4,94 5,37 6,28 5,71 8,59 4,32 5,41 4,34 11,26 5,58 6,17 4,70 8,59 4,38 3,63
Jun-06 5,00 5,39 6,29 5,67 8,59 4,51 5,36 4,36 8,52 5,53 6,50 4,36 8,78 4,29 3,40
Mar-06 5,84 5,90 6,86 6,44 9,36 4,80 5,76 5,06 8,85 5,84 8,48 4,35 7,89 4,41 3,06
Dec-05 6,53 6,03 7,24 6,91 9,19 5,35 5,69 5,60 9,16 6,25 9,37 4,40 7,90 4,43 3,45
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In this case, the table highlights the period in which the potential extreme losses, calculated 
using the probabilities of default, were higher than the loss absorption buffer. In addition, the 
table excludes the values if the difference is lower than 1%. As expect, the general 
considerations previously made are still valid. In fact, there are high differences for Monte 
Paschi, Carige and Banco Popolare, as regards the last quarter. For many banks, such a 
difference spread out during the financial crises. Besides that, it is possible to see that for the 
insolvent banks such difference extends drastically 3 or 4 periods before the last available 
observation. These scores can indeed offer a better insight about their distress. Moreover, from 
Figure 16, which analyses the evolution of both the loss absorption buffer and the potential 
extreme losses expressed as percentage of the assets, we can deduct that, for the two insolvent 
banks, the latter is much bigger than the former. For the remaining banks of the sample, it is 
important to draw the attention on, first, the descending path of the loss absorption buffer and, 
second, the peaks of potential losses. The buffer is severely affected by the deterioration of the 
market capitalization, while the highest potential losses match the period of crisis. Apart from 
Table 13: Difference between Potential Extreme Losses and Loss Absorption Buffers  
DIFFERENCE UCG ISP UBI BP BPER BPM MPS CE BPSO CVAL CRG BDB BSRP PEL SPO
Jun-16 6,76% 0,43% 7,08% 13,47% 8,11% 4,87% 21,33% 5,26% 13,77% 0,58%
Mar-16 2,13% 3,10% 5,56% 3,40% 0,00% 20,57% 3,21% 12,17%
Dec-15 10,90% 0,23% 3,87%
Sep-15 0,75% 1,41% 19,51% 1,57% 5,33%
Jun-15 0,00% 2,87% 2,12% 19,19% 2,70% 6,81%
Mar-15 3,70% 2,34% 0,32% 17,79% 2,85% 6,32% 11,99%
Dec-14 0,02% 3,99% 3,01% 0,70% 16,04% 2,42% 5,88% 7,17%
Sep-14 3,99% 2,75% 1,39% 13,08% 1,17% 3,13% 7,34%
Jun-14 0,43% 4,89% 3,25% 2,60% 14,21% 0,45% 4,45% 9,28%
Mar-14 0,39% 5,29% 2,92% 3,01% 7,22% 0,26% 1,90% 3,12%
Dec-13 2,65% 4,48% 4,92% 3,80% 9,15% 1,76% 5,93%
Sep-13 3,62% 1,39% 4,91% 6,55% 7,57% 5,46% 10,44% 3,32% 2,67% 4,99% 10,31%
Jun-13 5,57% 2,81% 5,93% 8,61% 8,13% 8,42% 13,06% 0,76% 5,69% 3,29% 3,39% 9,39%
Mar-13 11,89% 5,87% 7,88% 10,68% 10,09% 12,38% 16,21% 2,90% 5,38% 3,93% 0,97% 0,61% 11,26%
Dec-12 16,06% 10,03% 9,35% 11,84% 10,52% 14,67% 15,44% 4,94% 5,94% 4,35% 1,65% 1,89% 2,49%
Sep-12 17,86% 11,77% 10,53% 12,83% 10,40% 16,82% 15,90% 6,32% 6,06% 4,62% 2,09% 3,75% 2,37%
Jun-12 16,67% 10,49% 8,94% 11,63% 7,59% 16,12% 11,98% 5,93% 5,53% 2,70% 2,43% 7,79% 0,33%
Mar-12 13,96% 8,40% 7,16% 8,79% 4,54% 13,55% 7,96% 4,19% 0,60% 0,05% 2,03% 6,88% 3,92%
Dec-11 8,79% 7,34% 5,64% 5,61% 2,97% 9,65% 0,97% 2,20% 1,17% 5,45% 3,04%
Sep-11 5,88% 5,44% 3,41% 4,19% 0,83% 7,32% 1,35% 0,90%
Jun-11 0,87% 0,02% 0,72% 2,62%
Mar-11 0,58% 0,91% 0,49%
Dec-10 0,45% 1,20% 0,64%
Sep-10 1,90% 3,31% 1,06%
Jun-10 7,58% 2,45% 0,89% 9,49% 1,99% 1,85%
Mar-10 11,13% 4,52% 0,47% 11,83% 0,08% 1,98%
Dec-09 16,61% 7,68% 2,64% 15,08% 4,20% 3,25%
Sep-09 17,09% 8,60% 2,37% 14,95% 4,46% 3,71% 0,79%
Jun-09 17,42% 8,19% 1,63% 14,07% 4,21% 3,25% 1,62% 0,37%
Mar-09 16,03% 6,44% 11,01% 2,89% 1,72% 0,29%
Dec-08 8,70% 0,53% 3,82% 0,69%
Sep-08
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Figure 16: Evolution of Potential Extreme Losses and Loss Absorption Buffers  
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Banca Carige and Monte Paschi, if we exclude the period characterized by the crisis and the 
last period, all the solvent banks does not satisfy the intervention criterion, or at least they are 
very close to it. Again, due to the facts presented before, the high volatility and the overall 
decline of the stock price of Italian banks can explain the rapidly increase of potential extreme 
losses in the last quarter. 
In conclusion, some considerations can be drawn about the optimal choice of an intervention 
threshold. In order to set an optimal trigger, it is necessary to evaluate the Type I and Type II 
errors. In other words, I had to identify how many wrong decisions the supervisory authority 
would have taken, if a certain threshold had been implemented. To do so, I collected all the 
value of distance to default7 that occurred when the potential extreme losses were equal or larger 
than the buffers. Rearranging the value from the lowest to the highest, it is possible to construct 
the cumulative distribution function. Moreover, since I employed different combinations of 
equity volatilities and default barriers obtaining very similar results, I can state that the shape 
of the distribution is not due to the specification of the model. Therefore, for a specific distance 
to default, the distribution gives the number of solvent banks, expressed in percentage, whose 
potential extreme losses were above the loss absorption buffer. For example, we can infer that 
50% of all the banks that satisfied the criterion, would have been subject to early intervention, 
if the distance to default level was set approximately at 2. Therefore, it is possible to state that 
this intervention threshold would have caused an unnecessary recovery of solvent banks in half 
of the occasion. In other words, a Type II error of 50%.   
For supervisory authorities, the cumulative density function is a useful tool to define the 
intervention thresholds and to understand the probabilities of committing Type I and Type II 
errors. However, given the data limitation problems about insolvent banks, I could provide 
reliable estimate only of the second type of error. Compared to the findings obtained by 
Goodhart and Segoviano (2015) (Figure 11), the cumulative distribution for the Italian solvent 
banks (Figure 17) appears to have more concentrate levels of distance to default. In fact, using 
the Italian dataset, the optimal threshold of 𝐷𝐷 = 1,5 proposed by Goodhart and Segoviano 
would have led to a Type II error of about 20%. This means that for one bank out of five the 
early intervention would have been triggered. Equally to them, when the distance to default is 
equal or lower that 2,8 (𝐷𝐷 ≤ 2,8), all the banks that satisfied the criterion for intervention are 
taken into account or, equivalently, no other banks had potential losses over the buffer when 
the distance to default is greater than 2,8. Unfortunately, with this dataset it is not possible to 
                                                          
7 𝐷𝐷 = 𝑑2 = −𝑁
−1(𝑃𝐷) and 𝑃𝐷 = 𝑁(−𝐷𝐷). 
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retrieve coherent estimates of the Type I errors, which, however, are very important information 
for supervisory authorities. If I consider Monte Paschi and Carige together with the insolvent 
banks, the distribution moves to the left, but the final results are still not much informative. In 
alternative, if I assume that the distribution function is similar to that obtained by Goodhart and 
Segoviano, it is possible to say that authorities might prefer to increase the threshold in order 
to reduce the Type I errors. 
  
Figure 17: Cumulative Distribution of banks fulfilling the Criterion of Intervention 
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Conclusions 
On the basis of the Goodhart and Segoviano (2015)’s model, I analysed the context of the Italian 
banking system, with respect to the early intervention stage. This phase, which is laid down by 
the BRRD, is an important characteristic of the new Banking Union project. However, the 
models signalling the need to entry into the recovery stage are not as much developed as those 
studying the triggers for resolution. I highlighted how a framework based on quantitative 
indicators could be beneficial to competent authorities when they have to decide whether to the 
start a recovery. For example, since the legislation does not provide a clear definition of the 
conditions that can trigger the early intervention phase, a quantitative metric would increase the 
convergence of supervisory activities across the Member States and, being built on observable, 
verifiable and objective data, it would be less vulnerable to manipulation and more clear and 
transparent to institutions. In addition, even if these models could be time consuming to 
develop, difficult to test and costly to update, they can be more effective in reducing and 
balancing the Type I and Type II errors.  
As regards the model specification, I explained that the criterion for intervention consists in the 
evaluation of the institutions’ ability to absorb both expected and unexpected losses. In fact, on 
the basis of the Basel regulatory framework, the expected losses should be managed through 
the pricing of exposures and through provisioning, since they are viewed as normal a cost 
component of doing business, while capital should serve to cover the institution from 
unexpected losses. Therefore, on the one hand, specific definitions were applied for the 
identification of the components of the loss absorption buffer, in particular by adopting some 
adjustments to the regulatory values of capital and risk weighted assets. On the other hand, to 
quantify the potential extreme losses, I employed the Merton’s model and the Vasicek’s model, 
to recover the probabilities of default and the loss distribution functions respectively.  
The results I obtained are based on a sample of Italian banks listed in the Milan stock exchange, 
excluding the institutions that conduct mainly investment activity. Therefore, I evaluated and 
compared both the past and the current (up to 30/06/2016) conditions of the Italian banks, with 
respect to their probability of default and their ability to absorb the potential extreme losses. 
First of all, the difficulties of Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena were clear under all the analyses 
made. Then, I also showed that the peaks of potential extreme losses and the highest 
probabilities of default for bigger banks match the periods following the global financial crisis 
and the European debt crisis. In addition, the last period of observations deserved a specific 
remark, since the results are substantially influenced by the very high volatilities values 
registered after the so-called “Brexit”. On the contrary, the smaller and solvent banks did not 
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exhibit particular outcomes, while the insolvent ones displayed their distress prior the 
insolvency, but not at a noticeable level as one could expect. Moreover, I illustrated the general 
descending path, since the end of 2005, of all the loss absorption buffers, that is more or less 
pronounced depending on the bank under examination. In conclusion, after aggregating the 
results for the banks that remained solvent, it is possible to provide the estimates of Type II 
error. For example, the optimal threshold of 𝐷𝐷 = 1,5, identified by Goodhart and Segoviano 
(2015), would have led to a Type II error of about 20%. This means that for one bank out of 
five, the early intervention would have been triggered unnecessarily. On the contrary, due to 
limitation on the availability of data of insolvent banks, it was not possible to provide consistent 
estimates of Type I error.   
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Annex B: Tables of summary statistics 
  
Prices Shares  
Table 1: Stock Prices and Total Common Shares Outstanding  
MktCap  
Table 2: Market Capitalisations  
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Table 3: Total Assets   
TA  
Table 4: Provisions   
PR 
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  Table 5: Short Term Liabilities   
ST L 
Table 6: Long Term Liabilities   
LT L 
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Table 8: Estimated Assets Values   
𝐴 
Table 7: Stock Volatilities for different windows 
𝜎𝐸  
180d  270d  360d  
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Table 9: Estimated Volatilities of Assets Returns 
𝜎𝐴 
Table 10: Minimised Estimation Errors   
𝜀   
